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Executive Compensation in the Charitable Sector: 
Beyond the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
Lauren Rogal* 
This Article examines charity executive compensation in light of the 
reforms enacted by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.  Charities receive 
preferential tax treatment under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code because they provide humanitarian, educational, and other services 
that benefit the public.  The payment of excessive compensation undermines 
the policy purpose of charitable tax status by diverting resources from the 
public good to private gain.  The costs are borne by the intended charitable 
beneficiaries, the subsidizing taxpayers, and the charitable sector as a 
whole, which requires public confidence to sustain its work. 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reformed charity compensation laws for 
the first time in decades, imposing an excise tax on compensation over $1 
million.  With its enactment, there are now three legal constraints on 
charity compensation that together provide piecemeal accountability.  This 
Article deconstructs the three mechanisms, assessing their enforceability 
and metrics for appropriate compensation.  It argues that the excise tax is 
the mechanism best tailored to the goals of Section 501(c)(3), but that it is 
impaired by a blunt and arbitrary metric.  This Article then explores 
alternative metrics that may better align with the policy objectives of 
501(c)(3) status and proposes avenues for further investigation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA”) reformed charity 
executive compensation for the first time in decades, introducing an across-
the-board excise tax on compensation over $1 million.1  Its enactment 
represents a significant step toward securing accountability for the use of 
the charitable tax exemption under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code.  These organizations receive preferential tax treatment to 
subsidize their provision of socially beneficial outputs that would otherwise 
be undersupplied.  Overcompensation of charity executives subverts this 
purpose by diverting those subsidies for private gain and undermining 
public confidence in the charitable sector. 
With the enactment of the TCJA, federal tax law now offers three 
mechanisms to constrain charity executive compensation.  This Article 
examines each mechanism with regard to its metric for gauging appropriate 
compensation and its enforceability.  The first mechanism is mandatory 
public disclosure of compensation arrangements, which in theory facilitates 
donor-imposed accountability.  In practice, however, donors seldom have 
adequate information, incentives, and market power to police 
compensation.  The second mechanism is regulatory enforcement against 
individual charities that overcompensate executives.  This tool relies on 
weak metrics for appropriate compensation and resource-intensive 
investigations.  The third mechanism is the TCJA’s blanket excise tax on 
the most generous compensation packages.  This is a potentially effective 
and easily administered tool, but it too applies an arbitrary metric for 
appropriate compensation.  Together, these mechanisms provide some 
piecemeal accountability but are poorly tailored to the goals of the 
charitable tax exemption. 
The lack of an effective regulatory framework both permits some 
charities to pay exorbitant salaries2 and obscures the extent of the 
overcompensation problem.  While there is reason to believe that 
overcompensation is confined to a small minority of charities,3 this is 
difficult to confirm without effective oversight.  Moreover, while abuse 
 
 1  I.R.C. § 4960(a)(1) (2018).  
 2  2014 Charity CEO Compensation Study, CHARITY NAVIGATOR 1 (Oct. 2014), 
https://www.charitynavigator.org/docs/2014_CEO_Compensation_Study.pdf (defending 
compensation in the sector generally, while conceding that some salaries are clearly “out-of-
line”). 
 3  In 2014, the median CEO compensation at charities with over $1 million in revenues 
was $123,462.  2016 Charity CEO Compensation Study, CHARITY NAVIGATOR 11 (Oct. 
2016), https://d20umu42aunjpx.cloudfront.net/2016+CEO+Comp+Study/2016+CEO+Comp 
ensation+Study.pdf.  
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may be rare, it generates media headlines4 that harm public confidence in 
the charitable sector.  In a 2015 public opinion survey, 41% of respondents 
indicated that nonprofit leaders are paid too much.5  Among the 35% who 
reported little or no confidence in the charitable sector, salaries and other 
spending were a major concern.6  Because charities rely on indirect 
subsidies, which accrue only to the extent that the public provides financial 
support, a perception of profligacy may inflict long-term damage to the 
sector.7  This trend reinforces the need for effective regulation of executive 
compensation. 
This Article proceeds in seven parts.  Part II introduces the charitable 
sector and the underlying policy objectives of the charitable tax exemption.  
Part III reviews the literature on determinants of executive compensation in 
both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors.  Parts IV, V, and VI examine the 
three legal constraints on charity compensation in turn, assessing their 
metrics and enforceability.  Part VII reviews options for further reform, 
focused on improving the metric for reasonable compensation that could be 
enforced through the TCJA’s excise tax. 
II. THE CHARITABLE SECTOR 
The United States has over 1.4 million charities,8 ranging from 
churches and schools to philanthropic foundations and neighborhood 
organizations.  Part II.A explains the general requirements and scope of the 
charitable tax exemption.  Part II.B surveys the scholarship on policy 
rationales for the exemption. 
 
 4  See, e.g., Nonprofit? She Gets Paid $761,560 to Run This Domestic Violence Group, 
MIAMI HERALD (July 26, 2018), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/07/2 
6/nonprofit-she-gets-paid-761560-to-run-this-domestic-violence-group/.  
 5  Suzanne Perry, 1 in 3 Americans Lacks Faith in Charities, Chronicle Poll Finds, 
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/1-in-3-Americ 
ans-Lacks-Faith/233613.  
 6  Id. 
 7  The number of households that donate to charity declined about 11% from 2000 to 
2014.  The difference was made up by a small number of wealthy donors, but this trend may 
not be sustainable in the long term.  Patrick M. Rooney, The Growth in Total Household 
Giving Is Camouflaging a Decline in Giving by Small and Medium Donors: What Can We 
Do About It?, NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 27, 2019), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2018/11/21/tot 
al-household-growth-decline-small-medium-donors/.  
 8  This figure includes 1,111,318 I.R.S.-registered 501(c)(3) organizations and roughly 
350,000 churches, which are not required to file with the I.R.S.  Because some churches opt 
to register, the total figure likely counts some charities twice.  Tax Exempt Organization 
Search, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/ (last updated Sept. 6, 2019); 
U.S. Religion Census 2010: Summary Findings, ASSOC’N STATISTICIANS AM. RELIGIOUS 
BODIES 5 (2012), http://www.usreligioncensus.org/press_release/ACP%2020120501.pdf.  
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A. Exemption Standards and Scope 
The charitable sector encompasses a broad range of organizations 
described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.9  This 
provision affords federal income tax exemption to entities that are 
“organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, 
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster 
national or international amateur sports competition . . . , or for the 
prevention of cruelty to children or animals[.]”10  The Department of 
Treasury regulations relax the statutory criteria somewhat, requiring 
charities to operate primarily (rather than exclusively) for exempt purposes 
and allowing them to pursue an “insubstantial” amount of non-exempt 
activities.11  The Code also forbids charities to engage in any political 
campaign activities or more than an insubstantial amount of legislative 
lobbying.12  Finally, the Code prohibits any inurement of charities’ net 
earnings to shareholders or other insiders.13  This provision effectively 
requires charities to have a nonprofit legal structure and limits their 
executive compensation to reasonable levels.14 
There are two subcategories of charities.  “Public charities” directly 
serve and receive support from the general public.  This status is available 
to organizations that (i) fall into a statutory category of archetypal charities, 
such as churches and schools;15 (ii) receive a significant portion of their 
financial support from the general public;16 or (iii) operate for the purpose 
of financially supporting another public charity.17  A 501(c)(3) organization 
that does not qualify for public charity status is automatically classified as a 
“private foundation.”18  Private foundations comprise less than ten percent 
 
 9  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018). 
 10  Id.  Regulations have further defined each of the exempt purposes listed in Section 
501(c)(3).  For example, “charitable” is expansively construed to include such purposes as 
“[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged . . . erection or maintenance of 
public [structures] . . . eliminat[ing] prejudice and discrimination . . . [and] combat[ting] 
community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) 
(2019). 
 11  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). 
 12  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 13  Id.  
 14  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).  See Part V for a discussion of the relationship 
between private inurement and executive compensation.  The IRS recognizes limited 
liability companies as exempt under Section 501(c)(3) when certain conditions are met, 
including that all members be Section 501(c)(3) organizations or public entities.  Richard A. 
McCray & Ward L. Thomas, B. Limited Liability Companies as Exempt Organizations – 
Update, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (2001), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb01.pdf. 
 15  I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1); 170(b)(1)(A). 
 16  Id. § 509(a)(2)(A). 
 17  Id. § 509(a)(3). 
 18  Id. § 509(a). 
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of the charitable sector and typically disburse grants as their primary 
activity, though some also conduct direct charitable programs.19  Because 
private foundations are generally funded and governed by a small group of 
connected individuals, they are considered less accountable to the public 
and therefore subject to stricter regulations.20 
Obtaining recognition as a Section 501(c)(3) organization confers 
several tax advantages.21  In addition to avoiding federal income tax, 
charities are the only category of exempt organization authorized to receive 
tax-deductible donations.22  Individuals who itemize their deductions may 
deduct up to fifty percent of their taxable income as charitable 
contributions, while corporations may deduct up to ten percent.23  This 
fundraising advantage makes Section 501(c)(3) a coveted status for 
nonprofit organizations, which cannot raise capital through equity 
investment.  Finally, recognized charities may also be eligible for 
exemption from certain state taxes.24 
The exemption is not absolute.  Charities must pay taxes when they 
engage in certain non-exempt activities and transactions.  The unrelated 
business income tax (“UBIT”), for example, applies regular corporate tax 
rates to charity earnings from commercial activities.25  Charities may also 
incur excise taxes on lobbying expenditures.26  Finally, certain private 
 
 19  As of September 2019, there were 108,131 private foundations and 7,678 private 
operating foundations registered with the I.R.S.  Tax Exempt Organization Search, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2019).  Private 
operating foundations are foundations that expend most of their resources directly 
conducting charitable activities. I.R.C. § 4942(j)(3).  Private operating foundations are 
subject to somewhat different rules than nonoperating foundations, but these distinctions do 
not affect executive compensation.  
 20  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4940 (imposing excise taxes on foundation investment income); § 
4942 (imposing excise taxes on a foundation’s failure to distribute 5% of its assets 
annually), § 4943 (imposing excise taxes on foundations that own a substantial portion of a 
business), § 4944 (imposing excise taxes on foundations that make risky investments), § 
4945 (imposing excise taxes on foundations that expend funds in violation of private 
foundation rules).  
 21  Most organizations must apply for recognition under Section 501(c)(3), though there 
are exceptions for churches, certain church affiliates, and organizations with less than 
$5,000 in annual revenue.  I.R.C. § 508(a)-(c). 
 22  Id. § 170(a). 
 23  Id. §§ 170(b)(1)(A); 170(b)(2)(A).  The deductible percentage for individuals 
typically depends on whether the recipient is classified as a public charity or a private 
foundation. 
 24  See, e.g., TEX. CODE ANN. §§ 151.310(a)(2) (West 2019) (sales, use, and excise tax 
exemption), 171.063(a)(1) (franchise tax exemption); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23701d(a) 
(West 2019) (corporate income and franchise tax exemption); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-401.5 
(West 2019) (income tax exemption), 58.1-609.11.B (sales and use tax exemption). 
 25  I.R.C. § 512.  UBIT applies to net income from a trade or business that is regularly 
carried on and not substantially related to the organization’s exempt purposes. 
 26  Public charities must pay tax on lobbying expenditures in excess of a formula-based 
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foundations and universities must pay tax on their net investment income.27  
These exceptions restrict charities from exploiting their tax-exempt status 
to compete with for-profit businesses, exercise political power, or 
accumulate unutilized wealth.  In short, the exceptions help to ensure that 
the scope of the exemption aligns with its policy rationale, explored below. 
B. Policy Basis for the Charitable Exemption 
Although charities have enjoyed tax-exempt status under every 
revenue law since Congress first imposed peacetime corporate taxes in the 
late nineteenth century,28 the legislative record sheds little light on the 
rationale for the exemption.29  Because tax exemption for religious and 
educational institutions has ancient historical roots, Congress may have 
considered the rationale so self-evident as to not require an explanation.30 
Scholars have stepped into this void with a range of theories 
purporting to explain the exemption.  They draw primarily on economics, 
but occasionally introduce factors such as altruism, pluralism, and critical 
race theory.31  The dominant perspective is that the exemption exists to 
subsidize and encourage private sector provision of positive social outputs 
that would otherwise be undersupplied.32  The Supreme Court stated the 
 
threshold amount.  Id. § 4911(a).  Private foundations must pay tax on all lobbying 
expenditures.  Id. § 4945(d)(1). 
 27  Id. § 4940(a)-(e) (imposing a tax of up to 2% the net investment income of private 
foundations that are not exempt operating foundations); id. § 4968(a) (imposing a tax of 
1.4% on the net investment income of many private colleges and universities). 
 28  The Revenue Act of 1894 provided that “nothing contained herein shall apply to . . . 
corporations, companies, or associations organized and conducted solely for charitable, 
religious, or educational purposes . . .”  Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509.  It 
was short-lived, however.  The following year, the Supreme Court invalidated the corporate 
tax on constitutional grounds.  Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 
(1895).  Following the 1913 ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, which permits income 
taxation, Congress reenacted a revenue code with exempt status for certain charitable 
organizations.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G), 38 Stat. 114, 
172. 
 29  Boris I. Bittker & Georget K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations 
from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 302, 304 (1976) (noting that the enacting 
Congress “devoted little discussion” to the matter and concluding that “legislative history of 
the tax exemption reveals no systematic analysis”).  
 30  See John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and 
Constitutional Analysis, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 521 (1992) for an overview of tax exemption for 
religious institutions from ancient civilizations to the present day. 
 31  For excellent synopses of these theories, see David A. Brennen, A Diversity Theory 
of Charitable Tax Exemption – Beyond Efficiency, Through Critical Race Theory, Toward 
Diversity, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 1 (2006); Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income 
Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. 
REV. 419 (1998); Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for 
Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395 (1997). 
 32  Atkinson, supra note 31, at 405. 
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rationale as follows: 
Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt 
entity confers a public benefit—a benefit which the society or 
the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or 
which supplements and advances the work of public institutions 
already supported by tax revenue. History buttresses logic to 
make clear that, to warrant exemption under § 501(c)(3) an 
institution must fall within a category specified in that section 
and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the 
public interest.33 
In short, charities provide outputs that Congress has deemed 
beneficial to society.34  Some of these outputs are classic public goods: they 
are non-rivalrous, meaning that one person’s consumption does not detract 
from another’s, and non-excludable, meaning that anyone can access the 
good regardless of whether they have paid for it.35  Pure public goods are 
rare, but may include outputs such as public radio and clean air.  Non-
rivalry and non-excludability create a strong incentive for individuals to 
freeride, consuming public goods without contributing to their 
production.36  In competitive markets, freeriding means that public goods 
will be underfunded and therefore supplied at less than socially optimal 
levels.37 
Similar logic applies to quasi-public goods, which have characteristics 
of both public and private goods, and private goods with positive 
externalities, such as education and healthcare.38  Most charity outputs fall 
into these categories.  Because their marginal societal benefit exceeds their 
marginal private benefit, private purchasing decisions will not generate the 
optimal level of output.39 
Governments can mitigate this market failure by directly providing 
undersupplied goods or subsidizing private suppliers.  Subsidies may be 
direct, in the form of public spending, or indirect, in the form of 
preferential tax treatment.40  While direct subsidies are more efficient than 
 
 33  Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591–92 (1983). 
 34  Id.  In addition to aligning with the permissible statutory purposes, charities must 
comport with established public policy.  Id. at 591.   
 35  Tyler Cowen, Public Goods and Externalities: Old and New Perspectives, in PUBLIC 
GOODS AND MARKET FAILURES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 3 (Tyler Cowen ed., 1988). 
 36  Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1215–16 (2010) 
[hereinafter Keep Charity Charitable]. 
 37  Id. at 1216. 
 38  Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 777, 
787–88 (2012) [hereinafter The Role of Charity]; Keep Charity Charitable, supra note 36, at 
1216 n.8.  
 39  Keep Charity Charitable, supra note 36, at 1216. 
 40  This preferential tax treatment includes both the exemption and the deduction.  
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indirect subsidies, scholars have suggested reasons to prefer indirect 
subsidization.  First, indirect subsidization allocates the cost 
disproportionately to those persons who most value the outputs (i.e. 
donors).41  Second, having taxpayers select the subsidized organizations 
through their donations builds civic engagement.42  Third, the indirect 
approach may help to ensure that subsidies reach minority groups that 
would not have enough political power to compete for direct subsidies.43  
In order to realize these advantages, members of the public must provide 
funds to suppliers and, therefore, must have some degree of confidence in 
their performance. 
According to Professor Hansmann, this need for public confidence 
explains why the subsidies are reserved for nonprofit organizations, even 
though for-profit companies are, at least in theory, equally capable of 
producing charitable outputs.44  Hansmann identified the hallmark of 
nonprofit organizations as the “nondistribution constraint,” which 
precludes the dissemination of net earnings to owners, managers, or other 
insiders.45  The nondistribution constraint helps to alleviate three “contract 
failures” in the delivery of charitable outputs.46  Each contract failure 
impairs the ability of funders—whether donors or purchasers—to monitor 
the quality or quantity of outputs, allowing for-profit suppliers to divert 
 
Daniel E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 552–53 
(2006) (“In Congress, the courts, the media, and now academia . . . the deduction is widely 
viewed as a government subsidy . . . .”).  
 41  See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 
VA. L. REV. 1393, 1399–1406 (1988). 
 42  See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, 
Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 229 (2009); Saul 
Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 405 (1998).  Detractors point out, 
however, that the exemption only benefits those organizations that have positive net 
revenues and therefore less need for subsidization than those that merely break even or 
operate at a loss.  Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit 
Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 355–57 
(1991). 
 43  Hall & Colombo, supra note 42, at 392–93.  
 44  See generally Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit 
Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L. J. 54 (1981) [hereinafter 
Rationale]; Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980) 
[hereinafter Role of Nonprofit Enterprise].  Other scholars have supplemented or slightly 
revised Hansmann’s theory of contract failure, but it remains the prevailing rationale for 
restricting charitable tax-exempt status to nonprofits.  For example, Daniel Shaviro added 
the insight that certain nonprofits, particularly those with a “virtuous or public-spirited 
halo,” attract altruistically motivated workers, whom purchasers can trust to perform even 
without close monitoring.  Daniel Shaviro, Assessing the “Contract Failure” Explanation 
for Nonprofit Organizations and Their Tax-Exempt Status, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1001, 
1003–04 (1997) (conceding that he differs with Hansmann “in little beyond emphasis”). 
 45  Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 838.  
 46  Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 845. 
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funds to their shareholders.47 
The first contract failure affects donation-funded charitable 
activities.48  Because donors generally do not consume the outputs of their 
donations, they have difficulty monitoring the quality of those outputs.49  
The second contract failure arises in the case of public goods.50  While 
some people may be inclined to fund public goods out of beneficence or the 
prospect of reputational benefits, the non-rivalrous quality of public goods 
makes it difficult for funders to monitor whether their contributions 
actually increase output.51  The third contract failure involves the provision 
of “complex personal services,” such as education and healthcare.52  While 
individuals often purchase these services for their own consumption, most 
are not sophisticated enough to cost-effectively assess the quality of the 
services they receive.53  These contract failures give for-profit suppliers 
latitude to shirk on the provision of charitable outputs in favor of 
distributing greater profits to their shareholders. 
In order for indirect subsidization to succeed, suppliers must have 
structural safeguards to prevent the misappropriation of resources for 
private gain.  The nonprofit structure, with its nondistribution constraint, 
provides assurance that resources are not siphoned to owners through 
dividend payments.54  Yet nonprofits can still divert resources into private 
hands by extravagantly compensating their executives.  Part III examines 
the economic and organizational dynamics that facilitate executive 
overcompensation. 
 
 
 
 47  Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 843. 
 48  Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 846. 
 49  Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 847. 
 50  Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 850. 
 51  Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 850–851. 
 52  Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 862–66. 
 53  Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 872. 
 54  Hansmann believes tax subsidies are necessary to offset the fact that the nonprofits 
cannot raise equity capital.  In this sense, Hansmann has the exemption flowing from the 
preference for nonprofit provision of services, rather than the other way around.  Rationale, 
supra note 44, at 74–75.  Detractors have pointed out that tax exemption confers the greatest 
benefits to the charities with the most capital.  Hall & Colombo, supra note 42, at 388.  
Indeed, Hansmann concedes that his theory is a particularly poor fit for the case of nonprofit 
hospitals, which are often flush with capital. Rationale, supra note 44, at 87.  A simpler 
explanation is that the subsidizing government does not wish its subsidies to be diverted to 
shareholders.  Atkinson, supra note 31, at 406.  
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III. THE DYNAMICS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
Executive compensation has been the focus of extensive scholarship,55 
much of it seeking to explain the dramatic increase in C-Suite pay over the 
past several decades.56  One study found that inflation-adjusted CEO 
compensation rose nearly 1000% from 1978 to 2015.57  Compensation in 
the nonprofit sector has risen at a slower pace overall, but jumped sharply 
among the highest-paid executives.58  Part III reviews the literature on the 
determinants of executive compensation.  Part III.A examines research on 
the for-profit sector, which primarily uses public company data and is far 
more extensive than nonprofit compensation scholarship.  Part II.B 
discusses how dynamics evident in for-profit businesses appertain to the 
charitable sector. 
A. Theories of Executive Compensation 
There are two dominant theoretical perspectives in the literature on 
executive compensation in the for-profit sector.59  Optimal contracting 
theory puts faith in the arms-length bargaining process between self-
interested companies and executives.  Managerial power theory disputes 
the fairness and efficiency of that process, deriding market failures that 
result in excessive pay.  This Part discusses both theories in turn, but begins 
by summarizing the agency principles that underpin them. 
Agency theory instructs that business principals (i.e. investors) 
appoint agents (i.e. executives) to serve their interests and relieve them of 
their immediate stewardship responsibilities.60  But the interests of 
principal and agent are misaligned in various ways.61  First, self-interested 
 
 55  For a review, see Cynthia E. Devers et al., Executive Compensation: A 
Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments, 33 J. MGMT. 1016–72 (2007).  
 56  Lawrence Mishel & Jessica Schieder, CEO Compensation Grew Faster Than the 
Wages of the Top .01 Percent and the Stock Market, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Jul. 13, 2016), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensation-grew-faster-than-the-wages-of-the-top-0-
1-percent-and-the-stock-market/. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Andrea Fuller, Charity Officials Are Increasingly Receiving Million-Dollar Paydays, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/charity-officials-are-increasingly-
receiving-million-dollar-paydays-1488754532.   
 59  See, e.g., Pete Woodlock & Sheen Liu, Two Views of CEO Compensation: Part of 
the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 2 J. THEORETICAL ACCT. RES. 52 (2007); Michael B. 
Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal 
Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 258 (2005).  
 60  Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) 
(defining an agency relationship as a “contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent”). 
 61  Id. 
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executives have an incentive to shirk their duties or mobilize company 
resources for personal gain rather than investor profit.62  Second, because 
executives’ human and reputational capital is disproportionately invested in 
one company, they tend to be more risk-averse than the diversified 
investors.63  The divergence of interests forces principals to monitor their 
agents, but effective oversight is impeded by resource constraints, 
coordination problems among the principals, and information asymmetries 
between the principals and agents.  As a result, companies incur a residual 
loss, which is simply a deadweight loss to principal welfare.64  Agency 
costs65 increase as enterprises expand and investors appoint intermediaries 
(i.e. directors or managers) to select and monitor executives on their 
behalf.66 
The traditional perspective on executive compensation, optimal 
contracting theory, maintains that competitive market pressures produce 
efficient compensation arrangements.67  Boards negotiate with executives 
at arm’s length and determine the minimum compensation necessary to 
procure their services.68  In order to more closely align executive and 
shareholder interests, boards may issue performance-based compensation 
in the form of equity grants, options, or contingent cash payouts.69  
Performance-based compensation causes executives to internalize the 
consequences of company performance, motivating them to take more 
risk70 and work harder than they otherwise might.71 
 
 62  Id. at 312; Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. 
ECON. 288, 296 (1980). 
 63  See Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to 
Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1351 (2007) (“Managers of healthy companies 
generally prefer taking less risk than they would if they were acting in the interests of their 
presumptively diversified shareholders.  A shareholder has shares in many companies; a 
manager has only one job.”) (footnote omitted).  
 64  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 60, at 308–10.  
 65  Jensen and Meckling identify three components of agency cost: (1) monitoring costs 
by the principal; (2) bonding costs, which include any costs that the principal requires the 
agent to expend in order to minimize the risk of agent malfeasance; and (3) the “residual 
loss” from divergence between principal and agent interests that monitoring and bonding 
cannot neutralize. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 60, at 308. 
 66  Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, If So, What If Anything 
Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1016 (2009). 
 67  Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 762 (2002) [hereinafter Managerial 
Power]; Dorff, supra note 59, at 258. 
 68  Dorff, supra note 59, at 261. 
 69  David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal 
Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611, 618 (2011).  
 70  In the aftermath of the financial crisis, several commentators condemned equity 
compensation packages that rewarded short-term over long-term gains and therefore 
encouraged excessive risk taking.  See generally, Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Financial 
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Optimal contracting theorists are generally skeptical of claims that 
executives are overcompensated.72  Instead, they attribute skyrocketing 
executive pay to the scarcity of talent and the increasing complexity of 
management duties.73  Moreover, because equity compensation 
concentrates a significant portion of executives’ investment portfolios in 
one company, it is reasonable—necessary, even—to provide an additional 
cash premium to offset this non-diversification burden.74  This dynamic, 
optimal contracting theorists claim, explains the simultaneous surge in 
equity and salary compensation over the past two decades.75 
The main rival to optimal contracting theory is managerial power 
theory, promulgated most notably by Harvard professors Lucian A. 
Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried.76  Managerial power theory attributes the 
boom in executive compensation not to market forces, but rather to rent 
extraction by entrenched executives.77  Rents refer to private gains without 
a corresponding creation of value – in this context, to compensation that is 
not warranted by performance.78  Rent extraction is effectively a 
redistribution of wealth from shareholders to executives.79 
 
Crisis and Bank Executive Incentive Compensation, 25 J. CORP. FIN. 313, 341 (2014); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, How to Fix Bankers’ Pay, 139 DAEDALUS 52, 60 (2010).  However, the 
conventional concern has been that executives will behave more conservatively than 
shareholders’ interests dictate.  Walker, supra note 69, at 621 n.24. 
 71  In larger firms, managerial slack is generally considered a lesser concern than risk 
aversion.  Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive 
Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 689 (2011) (noting 
that “even the most strident incentive pay proponents do not suppose that, absent incentive 
pay, there would be large-scale loafing going on in corner offices”); Iman Anabtawi, 
Explaining Pay Without Performance: The Tournament Alternative, 54 EMORY L.J. 1557, 
1592 (2005) (“[Executives] have survived multiple rounds of weeding out of individuals 
with any appreciable taste for slack and have self-selected or become acculturated to hard 
work.”).  
 72  See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel They Get, 64 
HARV. BUS. REV. 125 (1986). 
 73  Dorff, supra note 59, at 262. 
 74  Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 3, 5 (2002) (showing that the cost of options to shareholders “significantly 
exceeds the value of the option from the perspective of a risk-averse, undiversified 
executive who can neither sell the option nor hedge against its risk”). 
 75  Id. 
 76  See generally Managerial Power, supra note 67; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. 
Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003) 
[hereinafter Agency Problem]; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without 
Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005) [hereinafter Overview]; 
LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004).  
 77  See generally Managerial Power, supra note 67. 
 78  Robert D. Tollison, The Economic Theory of Rent Seeking, 152 PUB. CHOICE 73, 74 
(2012).  Profits, in contrast, refer to gains from the efficient allocation of resources.  Id. 
 79  Dean Baker, The Upward Redistribution of Income: Are Rents the Story?, CTR. FOR 
ECON. AND POL’Y RES. 13 (2015), http://cepr.net/documents/working-paper-upward-
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Managerial power theory attributes executive rent extraction to 
failures of corporate governance.  In part, this takes the form of an implicit 
quid pro quo between directors and executives.80  Executives can reward 
cooperative directors in a variety of ways, including by recommending 
higher board compensation, providing social and professional connections, 
and ensuring that they are re-nominated to their lucrative positions.81  
Procedural and psychological factors also facilitate rent extraction.82  Board 
decisions are largely based on information provided by the executives 
themselves.83  Directors also tend to be wealthy, which distorts their 
perception of reasonable compensation,84 and have “a natural psychological 
tendency to believe that the high salaries of corporate executives accurately 
reflect executives’ intrinsic worth.”85 
To bolster the legitimacy of their compensation packages, companies 
often task independent compensation consultants and committees with 
recommending compensation levels based on market-rate metrics.86  
Managerial power theorists are quick to point out that this has done little to 
contain the rise in executive pay, because consultants and committee 
members are just as influenced as directors by their desire for 
reappointment.87  Companies cannot resolve managerial power dynamics 
simply by outsourcing decisions. 
Bebchuk and Fried identify shareholder “outrage” as the chief 
constraint on executive compensation.88  Shareholders have several 
avenues to express such outrage.  First, they may vote to remove directors 
 
distribution-income-rents.pdf.  See also Catherine T. Jeppson et al., CEO Compensation and 
Firm Performance: Is There Any Relationship?, 7 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 81, 85 (2009) 
(concluding that despite “a presumed strong relationship between CEO compensation and 
firm performance, we did not find this to be the case”). 
 80  Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 73. 
 81  Overview, supra note 76, at 656–57; Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 73–74.  
Median director compensation in 2015 was $258,000 per year, nearly double the 2000 
figure.  Sacha Pfeiffer & Todd Wallack, Few Hours, Soaring Pay for Corporate Board 
Members, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/12/01/go 
od-work-you-can-get-corporate-directors-among-highest-paid-part-time-employees-
america/rYHPP7ozPXU0AG8VSo37MM/story.html?p1=Article_Related_Box_Article. 
 82  Posner, supra note 66, at 1023. 
 83  Managerial Power, supra note 67, at 772. 
 84  Charles A. O’Reilly III & Brian G.M. Main, Economic and Psychological 
Perspectives on CEO Compensation: A Review and Synthesis, 19 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 
675, 686 (2010).   
 85  Posner, supra note 66, at 1023 (footnote omitted). 
 86  Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 78. 
 87  Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 79; Bernice Grant, Independent Yet Captured: 
Compensation Committee Independence After Dodd-Frank, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 761, 777–83 
(2014). 
 88  Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 75. 
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whom they believe have overcompensated executives.  Second, 
shareholders have also initiated derivative suits claiming that the directors’ 
approval of certain compensation packages constitutes a fiduciary breach or 
waste of corporate assets, though with decidedly mixed results.89  Finally, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission often requires public companies 
to obtain shareholder approval before issuing equity compensation,90 and 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires 
periodic, non-binding shareholder votes on executive compensation.91  
Companies unsurprisingly respond to shareholder outrage by scaling back 
pay.92  Nevertheless, shareholder outrage has its own constraints.  For 
example, positive economic forecasts in the industry tend to diminish 
outrage.93  Companies can also curtail outrage by obscuring the true value 
of compensation through non-salary arrangements such as deferred 
compensation, expense accounts and other perks, equity stakes, guaranteed 
future consulting contracts, and exorbitant severance payments.94  It is 
therefore atypical for shareholder outrage to serve as a strong bulwark 
against executive rent extraction. 
Scholars have empirically tested both optimal contracting and 
managerial power theories with inconsistent results.95  A 2015 meta-study 
of over 200 empirical research studies concluded that both optimal 
contracting and managerial power factors influence compensation to 
varying degrees and that the two theories “do not represent competing 
 
 89  See, e.g., Rubin v. Murray, 943 N.E.2d 949 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (upholding a 
finding of fiduciary breach due to excessive compensation).  In Delaware, such claims have 
settled with the payment of plaintiff attorneys’ fees, but face high barriers to success at trial.  
See, e.g. City of Plantation Police Officers’ Emp.’s Retirement Sys. v. Jeffries, No. 2:14-cv-
1380, 2014 WL 470400, at *8-9 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 30, 2014) (approving a settlement in a 
derivative lawsuit claiming fiduciary breach and corporate waste, while noting that “[e]ven 
if plaintiff were able to rebut the presumption created by the business judgment rule, 
plaintiff’s claim for excessive compensation would nevertheless be difficult to prove” and 
“plaintiff would also face significant hurdles in proving a breach of fiduciary duty”); In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 
(Del. 2006).  
 90  In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a rule mandating that firms 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ obtain shareholder approval of any 
new equity compensation plans and material amendments to existing plans.  Self-Regulatory 
Organizations, SEC Release No. 34-48108, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1540 (June 30, 2003).  
 91  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1367, 1899 (2010).  Section 951 of Dodd-Frank 
amended the Securities Exchange Act.  15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2018). 
 92  Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 75–76. 
 93  Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 76. 
 94  Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 79–80. 
 95  Marc van Essen et al., Assessing Managerial Power Theory: A Meta-Analytic 
Approach to Understanding the Determinants of CEO Compensation, 41 J. MGMT. 164, 166 
(2015).   
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explanations but describe points on a continuum . . . .”96  In other words, 
the compensation practices of many companies reflect a hybrid of market-
based forces and rent extraction. 
B. Compensation in the Charitable Sector 
Agency principles also apply, if not identically, to the charitable 
sector.  While charities have no shareholders, the board of directors has a 
legal duty to steward the charity in furtherance of its exempt purposes.97  
To that end, the board appoints executives and monitors their performance. 
In certain respects, the charity principal and agent have more 
convergence of interests than in the for-profit sector.  They likely share a 
commitment to the charity’s mission,98 and charity directors do not have an 
equity stake in the charity that might drive a predilection for risk-taking.  
Yet rational charity executives still have an incentive to shirk and 
maximize their personal gain.99  They also have a disproportionate 
investment of human and reputational capital in the charity compared to 
directors, which may affect their preferences.100 The charity structure does 
not, therefore, nullify the agency problem found in other organizations. 
Charities have certain governance dynamics that Bebchuk and Fried 
found to facilitate rent extraction in public companies. Charity executives 
typically have influence in the compensation-setting process, directing the 
flow of performance-related information to the board.101 Nonprofit 
 
 96  Id. at 187 (concluding after a regression of 219 studies that, “[m]anagerial power . . . 
has an important influence over the pay-setting process, but optimal contracting 
arrangements may also exist”). Bebchuk and Fried also concede that compensation is “likely 
to be shaped both by market forces that push toward value-maximizing outcomes, and by 
managerial influence[.]” Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 73. 
 97  See, e.g. Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Svcs., 112 S.W. 3d 486,  504 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (directors must be “principally concerned about the effective 
performance of the nonprofit’s mission”); In re Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. 
Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 595 (N.Y. Sup. 1999) (a nonprofit board must “in the first 
instance, seek to preserve its [. . .] mission.”). While nonprofit organizations do not have 
shareholders, they may have “members” who elect or appoint directors.  In such cases, the 
members would function as principals in the agency relationship. 
 98  In a 2015 survey, 86% of nonprofit directors reported that they joined their 
respective boards “to serve the organization and contribute to its success.”  Only one quarter 
reported being motivated by the prospect of furthering personal or professional interests.  
2015 Survey on Board of Directors of Nonprofit Organizations, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. BUS. 
& ROCK CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE 7 (2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/file 
s/publication-pdf/cgri-survey-nonprofit-board-directors-2015.pdf.   
 99  Brian Galle & David I. Walker, Nonprofit Executive Pay as an Agency Problem: 
Evidence from U.S. Colleges and Universities, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1881, 1895–96 (2014). 
 100  For example, directors may favor a merger that will bolster charitable impact, 
whereas executives may object due to the risk to their position. 
 101  Even when charities take advantage of the legal safe harbor for executive 
compensation arrangements (discussed in Part V), the executive may provide information 
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leadership is highly homogenous,102 and directors have social and 
professional ties to executives that may foster a culture of deference.103 
These factors may contribute to overcompensation in the charity context 
much as they do in public companies. 
Moreover, certain aspects of the agency problem may be more 
difficult to address in the charitable sector than in the for-profit sector.  
First, charity principals have additional barriers to monitoring performance.  
They nearly always serve on a volunteer basis,104 which may deprioritize 
their charity duties relative to their other professional obligations.  They 
may also have a more difficult task in assessing executive performance.  
While for-profit companies can utilize the simple metric of profits as a 
proxy for firm performance (and, by extension, executive success), 
charitable impact is more nuanced and susceptible to distortion by a self-
interested executive.105 
Second, while for-profit companies may try to align principal and 
agent interests by issuing equity compensation, charities cannot do so 
without violating the non-distribution constraint and prohibition on private 
inurement.  Charities can offer non-equity forms of incentive 
compensation, such as cash bonuses for achievement of certain 
benchmarks, but only if the overall compensation remains reasonable and 
the benchmarks denote individual performance.106  This makes it difficult 
 
relevant to his or her compensation before recusing herself from board deliberations. See 
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(ii). While the regulations permit an executive to “answer 
questions” from the board prior to deliberations, the I.R.S.’s sample conflict of interest 
policy for charities provides broader latitude, allowing a conflicted person to “make a 
presentation” before recusal. Instructions for Form 1023, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 26 
(2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1023.pdf.   
 102  A 2017 survey found 84% of directors, 90% of chief executives and board chairs, are 
white, and that 83% of directors are over 40. While the survey did not collect data on the 
income levels of board members, it found that only 22% of chief executives and 39% of 
board chairs are satisfied with their board’s level of socioeconomic diversity. Leading with 
Intent: 2017 National Index of Nonprofit Board Practices, BOARDSOURCE 11 (2017), 
https://leadingwithintent.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/LWI-2017.pdf. 
 103  Tivoni Devor, The Face of Nonprofit Boards: A Network Problem, NONPROFIT Q. 
(Mar. 4, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/the-face-of-nonprofit-boards-a-network-probl 
em/. 
 104  Approximately one percent of charities pay salaries or honoraria to board members, 
though this increases among private foundations to three percent paying salaries and five 
percent paying honoraria.  Supra note 102, at 52. 
 105  Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 
(2011) (“Accountability to mission is exceedingly difficult to measure and police.”); Linda 
Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience 
into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 919 (2007) (“Measuring effectiveness may be the 
most intractable problem that charities have: Because their goals rarely translate into 
measurable returns, and are often long-term, there may be no way to measure success in a 
timely way, or at all.”). 
 106  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991) (disallowing payment to 
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to devise a compensation structure where executives internalize 
organizational outcomes. 
Finally, the major constraint against overcompensation in the for-
profit sector, shareholder outrage, has no close analogue in the charitable 
sector.  The losers from overcompensation are not shareholders, but the 
intended charitable beneficiaries.  Unlike shareholders, charitable 
beneficiaries usually have no voting rights or standing to sue.  Concerned 
members of the public can refer charities to the I.R.S. by submitting a 
complaint form, but it is unclear how often these are actually reviewed.107  
The outrage constraint is therefore more likely to be imposed by donors, 
who have the power to inflict financial pain in much the same way as 
divesting shareholders.108  Yet, as Part IV explores in depth, even donors 
are much less equipped than shareholders are to monitor and respond to 
compensation practices. 
Because charities, like for-profit businesses, are susceptible to 
executive rent seeking and other market distortions, there is a risk that these 
subsidized organizations will misappropriate resources as executive 
overcompensation.  In order to safeguard the intent of the exemption, the 
law offers several mechanisms to constrain executive compensation.  Parts 
IV, V, and VI explore these mechanisms and their effectiveness in 
upholding the policy purposes of the charitable exemption. 
IV. FIRST MECHANISM: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND  
DONOR MARKET ORDERING 
The first constraint on compensation is mandatory public disclosure.  
The availability of compensation data permits donors and other 
stakeholders to withdraw their support from charities that extravagantly 
compensate their executives, putting downward pressure on compensation 
levels.  Part IV.A details the disclosure rules.  Part IV.B explains why, in 
practice, transparency seldom leads to donor-based accountability. 
 
physicians based on hospital or departmental earnings and contrasting the decision with that 
of Rev. Rul. 69-383, which approved a compensation arrangement where a hospital paid a 
radiologist a fixed percentage of his individual gross billings); World Family Corp. v. 
Comm’r, 81 T.C. 958, 970 (1983) (approving the payment of commissions to individuals 
based on the amount they personally procured for the organization and distinguishing the 
instant case from situations where an individual received commissions based on total 
fundraising regardless of personal performance); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200601030 
(Oct. 12, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9316052 (Jan. 29, 1993); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 
39,670 (Oct. 14, 1987). 
 107  I.R.S. Complaint Process - Tax-Exempt Organizations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 
(last updated Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/irs-complaint-proces 
s-tax-exempt-organizations.   
 108  Galle & Walker, supra note 99, at 1887. 
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A. Overview of the Public Disclosure Regime 
All charities, with the exception of certain religious and small 
organizations, must file an annual informational return (Form 990) with the 
I.R.S..109  Charity returns disclose the amount of compensation paid to (i) 
current officers, directors, trustees, key employees, and highest-
compensated employees;110 (ii) former directors and trustees who receive 
more than $10,000 in their capacity as former directors or trustees; and (iii) 
former officers, key employees, and highest-compensated employees who 
currently receive more than $100,000 in any capacity.111  For each of these 
listed individuals, the return must disclose the hours worked and the value 
of reportable and non-reportable compensation paid by the charity and any 
related organizations.112 
Charities must submit a supplemental Schedule J for any listed 
individuals who are former executives, who receive over $150,000 in 
aggregate from the charity and related organizations, or who receive 
compensation from unrelated parties for services rendered to the charity.113  
Schedule J requires a detailed breakdown of the compensation components, 
such as deferred and incentive compensation.114  It also requires disclosure 
of lavish benefits such as first class travel, discretionary spending accounts, 
and housing allowances.115  Finally, charities must explain the 
compensation-setting process, including whether they use salary surveys 
and independent decision-makers.116 
Form 990 must be made available for public inspection upon 
request.117  This requirement permits watchdog organizations to aggregate 
and publish the returns of most charities on their websites in a searchable 
format.118  They periodically generate reports revealing the most highly 
 
 109  I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A) (2018). 
 110  Id. § 6033(b)(7); Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(a)(2)(ii)(h) (2019).  A “key employee” is 
one who (i) earns more than $150,000 in reportable compensation from the organization and 
related organizations; (ii) has responsibilities resembling those of directors or officers, or 
oversees ten percent or more of the organizational operations or budget; and (iii) is among 
the highest-compensated twenty employees.  Instructions for Form 990, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV. 65 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf.   
 111  Form 990, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 7 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f990.pdf. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. at 8. 
 114  Schedule J Form 990, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 2 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/ 
irs-pdf/f990sj.pdf. 
 115  Id. at 1. 
 116  Id. 
 117  Treas. Reg. § 301.6104(b)-1(d)(1) (2019).   
 118  See GUIDESTAR USA, INC., https://www.guidestar.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2019); 
CHARITY NAVIGATOR, https://www.charitynavigator.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). 
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compensated charity executives.119  Many watchdogs also maintain a 
ratings system for larger charities, complete with gold stars or other 
accolades for high-rated organizations.120  These rating systems seldom 
assess executive compensation per se, instead focusing on the ratio of 
programmatic expenses to management and fundraising expenses.121  This 
ratio comes directly from the Form 990, where charities must allocate each 
expenditure line item among these categories.122  The I.R.S. instructions 
indicate that executive salaries generally belong in the management 
category, unless “a part of their time is spent directly supervising program 
services or fundraising activities,” in which case the allocation should be 
based on how the executives divide their time.123  This nebulous distinction 
between program and management activities means that charities often 
have some latitude to allocate executive compensation in a manner that 
positively affects their ratings.124 
B. Assessment of the Public Disclosure Regime 
The public disclosure mechanism effectively appoints donor 
perception as the metric of reasonable compensation.  This conveniently 
removes the thorny task of metric determination from the government’s 
purview, but raises the normative question of whether donor perception is a 
 
 119  See Top Compensation Packages, CHARITY WATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/to 
p-charity-salaries (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). 
 120  Charity Navigator rates organizations with at least $1 million in revenues on a 100-
point scale.  It gives charities up to four stars based on a 100-point rating system, but will 
only rate charities that meet longevity, revenue, public support, and other criteria. Charity 
Navigator’s Methodology, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cf 
m?bay=content.view&cpid=5593 (last visited Oct. 18, 2019).  Charity Watch focuses 
charities with over $1 million in revenues that have been operating for at least three years.  
It gives a letter grade to charities based on their financial efficiency.  Frequently Asked 
Questions, CHARITY WATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/about-charitywatch/faq#charity 
_selection (last visited Oct. 18, 2019); Our Charity Rating Process, CHARITY WATCH, 
https://www.charitywatch.org/our-charity-rating-process (last visited Oct. 18, 2019). 
 121  Financial Score Conversions and Tables, CHARITY NAVIGATOR (last updated June 1, 
2016), https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=48#Performan 
ceMetricOne; Criteria & Methodology, CHARITYWATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/abo 
ut-charitywatch/criteria-methodology/3113/3147 (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
 122  Form 990, supra note 111, at 10. 
 123  Instructions for Form 990, supra note 110, at 42. 
 124  The Quality of Financial Reporting by Nonprofits: Findings & Implications, URBAN 
INST. 1-2 (Aug. 2004), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/57736/311045-
The-Quality-of-Financial-Reporting-by-Nonprofits.PDF. The Urban Institute’s study of nine 
organizations of all sizes found that, at most sites, “one or two staff members make a 
retrospective judgment once per year about how everyone spent their time, and this is the 
basis for the functional allocation of personnel costs” for the Form 990. Id. The report noted 
that nonprofits are “responding to perceived and explicit pressure to keep real and reported 
administrative and fundraising costs low.” Id.  
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satisfactory barometer.  Although donors disproportionately subsidize 
charities through their contributions, non-donating taxpayers ultimately 
subsidize charity compensation as well.  Relying on donors to identify 
overcompensation presumes that they can meaningfully stand in for the 
interests of all taxpayers. 
Donor market ordering also presents practical problems, since donor 
backlash against overcompensation only materializes in the rare event of 
mass media coverage.125  For example, donations to the Wounded Warrior 
Project plummeted after the New York Times’s front-page exposé of 
extravagant pay and other spending.126  Without media attention, however, 
compensation practices have no statistically significant effect on 
donations.127  The reasons for this non-effect can be broadly classified as 
donor information deficits and donor outrage deficits. 
Most donors have informational deficits with respect to charity 
compensation.  For small or unsophisticated donors, performing due 
diligence is simply not cost-effective.128  Even donors who research the 
compensation figures may have difficulty assessing whether they are 
commensurate with the executives’ responsibilities and performance.  As 
Hansmann pointed out in his discussion of contract failures, donors seldom 
have firsthand knowledge of operations.129  Donors may refer to charity 
ratings, if available, but ratings usually do not dig deeper than the charity’s 
reported expenditure breakdown.  This information may be meaningful in 
some cases, but in other cases may give acclaim to operations that spend 
liberally but ineffectually.  Often, a donor in search of information about 
the charity’s mission outcomes must rely on annual reports and other 
charity-generated publications, which may project a misleading image by 
highlighting anecdotes over data, opportunistically selecting metrics, and 
omitting caveats.  These information deficits impair donors’ ability to 
assess and react to compensation levels. 
Outrage deficits mean that donors continue to contribute to charities 
despite knowledge of lavish executive compensation.  There are several 
potential explanations for this.  First, donors may not be troubled by 
 
 125  Steven Balsam & Erica E. Harris, The Impact of CEO Compensation on Nonprofit 
Donations, 28 ACCT. REV. 425, 437 (2014) (showing a strong and statistically significant 
negative correlation between media coverage of high compensation and subsequent 
donations).  
 126  Dave Philipps, Helping Veterans Recover, Spending Lavishly on Itself, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 28, 2016, at A1; Mark Hrywna, Revenue, Program Spending Decline Again at 
Wounded Warrior Project, NONPROFIT TIMES (Apr. 23, 2018), http://www.thenonprofittimes 
.com/news-articles/revenue-program-spending-decline-wounded-warrior-project/.  
 127  Balsam & Harris, supra note 125, at 437.  
 128  Balsam & Harris, supra note 125, at 439.  
 129  Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 843. 
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overcompensation because, unlike in for-profits, it does not come at their 
expense.  Donors may not even mind the diversion of their resources from 
the charitable mission if they are principally motivated by the promise of 
public recognition, event invitations, or other perks.130  Second, donors 
with a personal affinity for the charity (e.g. because it is their alma mater or 
religious denomination) may be disinclined to reallocate their funding in 
response to overcompensation.  Third, large donors who balk at paying for 
high executive compensation can simply require by contract that their 
donations be allocated elsewhere. Fourth, wealthy donors may be more 
inclined to perceive even very high compensation as reasonable. This 
possibility has particular salience because charitable giving is increasingly 
concentrated among high-income households, a trend that experts expect to 
accelerate in light of the TCJA’s near doubling of the standard income tax 
deduction.131 All of these factors can preclude donors from punishing 
charities that overpay executives. 
Despite the evidence that donors are generally unresponsive to 
executive compensation levels, the disclosure requirement could still 
constrain compensation by making charities wary of backlash from the 
media or particularly scrupulous contributors.  There is evidence that 
religiously affiliated colleges and universities with small endowments 
contain their compensation for fear of alienating donors.132  This finding 
suggests a deterrent value to mandatory disclosure, but also highlights that 
donor market ordering principally affects donor-dependent charities. Yet 
for many charities, private giving accounts for a minority of overall 
revenues.133  The other major sources of nonprofit revenue, government 
grants and program fees, appear equally insensitive to compensation levels 
in the absence of media attention.134  Some charities also enjoy funding 
 
 130  Rene Bekkers & Pamala Wiepking, A Literature Review of Empirical Studies of 
Philanthropy: Eight Mechanisms That Drive Charitable Giving, 40 NONPROFIT & 
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 924, 934-37 (2011).   
 131  Charitable Giving and Tax Incentives, INDIANA U. LILLY FAM. SCH. PHILANTHROPY 6 
(2019),  https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/1805/19515/tax-policy190603.pdf? 
sequence=4&isAllowed=y.  
The increase is effective for eight years, until 2026, unless it is extended. Pub. L. 115-97, 
131 Stat 2054 
 § 11021(a) (2017).  
 132  Galle & Walker, supra note 99, at 1919.  
 133  Brice S. McKeever, The Nonprofit Sector in Brief 2015: Public Charities, Giving, 
and Volunteering, URB. INST. 5 (Oct. 2015), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/non 
profit-sector-brief-2015-public-charities-giving-and-volunteering. The data showed that, 
among public charities, private charitable contributions comprised merely 13.3% of 
revenues. This figure, however, is driven largely by universities and hospitals receiving a 
high proportion of tuition payments, patient fees, and Medicaid and Medicare payments.  
 134  Balsam & Harris, supra note 125, at 441. 
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from endowments and long-term institutional grants, and therefore do not 
rely on ongoing donor goodwill. 
Public disclosure as a mechanism to regulate charity executive 
compensation relies on the judgment, motivation, and market power of 
donors.  Due to donor information and outrage deficits, transparency is 
unlikely to operate as an effective check on executive compensation.  The 
weakness of market-based accountability reinforces the need for an 
effective regulatory structure to ensure that compensation practices do not 
subvert the purpose of the charitable tax exemption. 
V. SECOND MECHANISM: REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
The second constraint on compensation is regulatory enforcement.  
The Code directly prohibits private inurement and permits executives to 
receive only reasonable compensation.  Violations can result in substantial 
financial penalties and/or the loss of tax-exempt status.  Part V.A describes 
the legal framework in depth.  Part V.B examines the merits and 
weaknesses of this mechanism. 
A. Regulatory Enforcement Regime Overview 
For over a century, Congress has conditioned charitable tax exemption 
on the absence of private inurement.135  This term refers to the diversion of 
charitable resources to individuals with “a personal and private interest in 
the activities of the organization,”136 including executives.137  Inurement 
may take a variety of forms, including loans with unusually lenient 
terms,138 payment of inflated rent,139 and insider use of charity-owned 
vehicles and housing.140  Early private inurement cases mostly dealt with 
 
 135  See, e.g., Corporate Tax Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 112 (1909); Revenue 
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 166 (1913).  The prohibition on inurement also 
expressly applies to nine of the twenty-seven other categories of exempt organizations.  
I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), (4)(B), (6), (7), (8), (11)(A), (13), (19)(C), (26)(D), (29)(B)(ii) (2018).  
Subsection (20) was repealed in 2014. 
 136  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-(1)(c) (2019). 
 137  The I.R.S. considers the rules on private inurement applicable to highly-paid 
employees who are not directors or officers.  See, e.g. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 
(Apr. 24, 1986) (applying the inurement ban to hospital physicians); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. 
Mem. 39,670 (Oct. 14, 1987) (applying the inurement ban to college athletic coaches).  The 
Tax Court, however, has repudiated the application of the inurement rules to mere 
employees, opting instead to apply the private benefit doctrine.  See, e.g. Senior Citizens of 
Mo., Inc. v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 480 (1988). 
 138  Orange Cty. Agr. Soc., Inc. v. Comm’r, 893 F.2d 529, 534 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 139  Tex. Trade Sch. v. Comm’r, 272 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1959).  
 140  Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1201 (Ct. Cl. 
1969). 
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annuity payments to insiders,141 but by the 1940s and 1950s, regulators had 
turned their attention to compensation as a potential source of inurement.142 
The I.R.S. has articulated three factors relevant to whether 
compensation arrangements violate the ban on inurement: (i) the 
underlying purpose of the compensation; (ii) the process by which the 
compensation was decided; and (iii) the reasonableness of the 
compensation amount.143  Agency and court decisions consistently consider 
these factors, but without any explicit balancing test or order of priority. 
The first factor is whether the purpose of the compensation package is 
to procure services or merely disguise the distribution of profits.144  This 
can be inferred from the circumstances and structure of the compensation.  
For example, a long-term contract that guarantees fixed compensation 
irrespective of performance is considered a distribution of profits.145  
Similarly, a significant increase in compensation without a commensurate 
expansion of responsibilities is likely to be construed as a distribution of 
profits.146  This inquiry calls for particular scrutiny of incentive 
compensation structures that calculate pay based on financial 
performance.147  For years, the I.R.S. vacillated between per se rejection 
 
 141  See, e.g., Lederer v. Stockton, 43 S. Ct. 5 (1922) (allowing an exemption despite the 
payment of annuities); Scholarship Endowment Found. v. Nicholas, 106 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 
1939) (rejecting an exemption due to the payment of annuities); Orton v. C.I.R., 9 T.C. 533, 
542 (1947) (allowing an exemption despite the payment of annuities where the “clear and 
predominant purpose [is] to aid the charity and where the noncharitable benefits are 
incidental to that purpose”).  
 142  See, e.g., Home Oil Mill v. Willingham, 68 F. Supp. 525, 529 (N.D. Ala. 1945) 
(holding that a charitable trust’s payment of “reasonable and . . . fair” compensation to the 
grantor’s sister in exchange for her active management of the trust did not defeat the 
exemption), aff’d, 181 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852; Mabee Petroleum 
Corp. v. United States, 203 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1953) (denying an exemption due to an 
excessive fixed salary paid to the founder).   
 143  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,670 (Oct. 14, 1987); Rev. Rul. 69-383, 1969-2 C.B. 113 
(articulating the three-factor test).  
 144  Rev. Rul. 69-383, 1969-2 C.B. 113. 
 145  Mabee, 203 F.2d at 876 (holding that the “purported salary payments were not 
intended merely to compensate him for services to be rendered, but were really authorized 
to assure him substantial distributions . . . in the form of salary”).  The contract in question 
had a term of fifteen years, which would have taken the executive to the age of eighty-two. 
 146  See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology, 412 F.2d at 1201 (surmising that the 
steady increase in L. Ron Hubbard’s compensation, which took the form of fees, loans, and 
commissions as well as base salary, reflected Hubbard’s influence in the organization rather 
than any growth in his responsibilities); Incorp. Trs. of the Gospel Worker Soc’y v. United 
States, 510 F. Supp. 374, 379 (D.D.C. 1981), aff’d, 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982) (finding that 300%, 350%, and 600% increases in 
compensation over eight years reflected the organization’s improved fundraising capacity 
rather than an expansion of individual responsibilities). 
 147  People of God v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 127, 132 (1980) (holding in the case of a minister 
who received a percentage of tithes, that “[w]hatever [the minister]’s services are worth, 
they are not directly related to [the church]’s gross receipts; the value of solace and spiritual 
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and conditional acceptance of such incentive structures.148  Since the 1980s, 
however, it has generally accepted incentive arrangements that have a 
predetermined ceiling149 and depend on individual achievement rather than 
organizational or exogenous factors.150 
The second factor focuses on how the compensation was determined.  
The I.R.S. considers the number of decision-makers, their relationship to 
the executive, and the bargaining process.  If the compensation 
arrangement did not result from arms-length bargaining,151 the organization 
 
leadership cannot be measured by the collection box”). 
 148  See, e.g. Rev. Rul. 69-383, 1969-2 C.B. 113 (permitting an exempt hospital to 
compensate a radiologist with a percentage of departmental gross proceeds after 
determining that the amount was reasonable and the arrangement was negotiated at arm’s 
length); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,865 (Jun. 21, 1974) (deeming profit-sharing plans per 
se inurement); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,180 (Jun. 24, 1977) (finding per se inurement in 
a deferred compensation plan for hospital physicians that included payment of investment 
gains and losses, even though the compensation amount and manner of adoption met I.R.S. 
standards); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,283 (Feb. 15, 1980) (reversing the Service’s 
previous position and concluding that incentive compensation in which profits are a factor 
does not automatically constitute inurement); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,670 (1987) 
(recognizing that deferred compensation may be invested without violating the inurement); 
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,674 (Jun. 17, 1987) (allowing profit-sharing plans if they 
otherwise satisfy a three-part test). 
 149  People of God, 75 T.C. at 132 (“By basing [the executive’s] compensation upon a 
percentage of . . . gross receipts, apparently subject to no upper limit, a portion of [the 
organization]’s earnings is being passed on” to the executive as private inurement.); I.R.S. 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201235021 (Jun. 4, 2012) (An organization pledged to pay twenty percent of 
its donations to a related organization for technology and administrative services.  The “lack 
of cap limit entails that [a related company] can receive unlimited income that will more 
than compensate [the company] for the services [it] renders to you.”); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. 
Mem. 38,322 (Mar. 24, 1980) (compensating a trust administrator and general counsel with 
a set percentage of contributions constituted inurement in part because “[n]o ceiling or 
maximum payment was imposed on the amount of compensation”); I.R.S. Advisory Letter 
2002-0021 (Jan. 9, 2002) (IRS advisory letter indicating that a ceiling on compensation is 
one factor in determining whether a physician’s compensation amounts to inurement); see 
also Instructions for Form 990, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 42 (2017), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i990—2017.pdf (“The fact that a bonus or revenue-sharing 
arrangement is subject to a cap is a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of 
compensation.”).   
 150  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991) (disallowing payment to 
physicians based on hospital or departmental earnings and contrasting the decision with that 
of Rev. Rul. 69-383, which approved a compensation arrangement where a hospital paid a 
radiologist a fixed percentage of his individual gross billings); World Family Corp., 81 T.C. 
at 970 (approving the payment of commissions to individuals based on the amount they 
personally procured for the organization and distinguishing the instant case from situations 
where an individual received commissions based on total fundraising regardless of personal 
performance). 
 151  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,670 (Oct. 14, 1987); World Family Corp., 81 T.C. at 
969 (“We must consider then whether a commission which may be reasonable when paid to 
an unrelated third party becomes unreasonable when paid to an individual having a personal 
and private interest in the payor organization.  Although in some circumstances such a 
finding may be warranted, it is clear that payment to an interested individual does not make 
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may bear a higher burden of proof to demonstrate that the arrangement is 
reasonable.152  The I.R.S. applies particular scrutiny to organizations 
dominated by a single individual or small group of individuals.153 
The third factor is the reasonableness of the compensation amount.154  
Reasonableness is “purely a question of fact to be resolved in the light of 
all the evidence.”155  For decades, decisions offered little consistent 
reasoning or usable guidance on what constituted reasonable compensation, 
except to suggest that insider pay should not consume all organizational 
earnings.156  Some decisions referenced Section 162 of the Code, which 
allows businesses a tax deduction for “reasonable . . . salaries or other 
compensation for personal services actually rendered[.]”157  Under Section 
162, reasonable compensation means the amount that would “ordinarily be 
paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances.”158  In 
1996, Congress effectively endorsed this definition when it legislated a safe 
harbor for charities that could demonstrate their payment of fair market 
value.159 
Upon a finding of private inurement, the I.R.S. may revoke the 
organization’s exempt status, but this is relatively rare.  Between 2011 and 
2013, the I.R.S. revoked the exempt status of fewer than 100 organizations 
 
a commission unreasonable as a matter of law.”).  
 152  Orange Cty. Agr. Soc., Inc., 893 F.2d at 534 (“The burden of proof is on the taxpayer 
to demonstrate that insiders do not benefit from the tax-exempt organization, especially 
where the facts indicate transactions arguably not on arm’s length terms.”). 
 153  See, e.g., Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 531, 
535 (1980) (finding an “obvious opportunity for abuse” where a single family comprised the 
entire voting board of directors and staff), aff’d, 670 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 154  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,670 (Oct. 14, 1987). 
 155  Bubbling Well Church, 74 T.C. at 537–38. 
 156  In a number of cases, courts held that the organization had failed to provide adequate 
justification for compensation that consumed a high proportion of earnings.  See, e.g., 
Bubbling Well Church, 74 T.C. at 535; Church of the Transfiguring Spirit, Inc. v. Comm’r, 
76 T.C. *1, *5-6 (1981); see also Brian Ruud Int’l v. United States, 733 F. Supp. 396, 402 
(1989) (finding that compensation was reasonable in amount because it was “relatively 
modest” compared to the organization’s earnings).  Others deemed compensation reasonable 
without further explanation. See, e.g., Saint Germain Found. v. Comm’r, 26 T.C. 648, 659 
(1956) (finding the organization’s payment of personal living expenses in lieu of salary “to 
be reasonable in every respect”).  
 157  See, e.g., Senior Citizens of Mo., Inc. v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 480, 480 (1988); 
Enter. Ry. Equip. Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 590, 595 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (referencing the 
analogous section on business deductions of the previous internal revenue law). 
 158  Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3) (2019). 
 159  Interestingly, decisions had long cited fair market value as the determining factor in 
whether the sale of assets created inurement, but this was not regularly applied to the 
analysis of compensation.  See, e.g., Anclote Psychiatric Ctr., Inc. v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 175, at *9 (1998) (to avoid inurement, the price of assets sold to an insider must be 
“within a reasonable range of what could be considered fair market values”). 
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for private inurement and related problems.160  In lieu of, or in addition to, 
revocation, the I.R.S. may impose potentially severe financial penalties for 
excessive compensation.  These penalties depend on whether the Code 
characterizes the organization as a public charity or a private foundation. 
1. Public Charities 
Public charities that overcompensate their executives may be 
penalized with “intermediate sanctions.”161  Enacted by Congress in 1996, 
the intermediate sanctions regime allows the I.R.S. to penalize private 
inurement without necessarily resorting to revocation of tax-exempt 
status.162  Intermediate sanctions apply to any “excess benefit transaction” 
between a public charity and a “disqualified person.”163  An excess benefit 
transaction is one where “the value of the economic benefit provided 
exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of 
services) received for providing such benefit.”164  Consideration in this 
context includes all forms of cash and noncash compensation, including 
salary, fees, bonuses, severance, taxable fringe benefits, expense 
allowances, below-market loans, and vested benefits under a qualified 
pension, profit sharing, or stock bonus plan.165  Executives generally count 
as disqualified persons,166 but the Code is primarily concerned with insider 
 
 160  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-164, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 
23 (2014) [hereinafter G.A.O. Report].  This figure includes revocations premised on both 
private inurement and private benefit.  
 161  Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4958-2(a)(1); 53.4958-2(a)(2)(i) (excepting private foundations 
from the intermediate sanctions rules). 
 162  Caracci v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 379, 417 (2002), rev’d on other grounds 456 F.2d 444 
(5th Cir. 2006); H.R. REP. NO. 104-226, at 55 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143, 
1177–78 (explaining that before the enactment of intermediate sanctions to penalize private 
inurement, the only sanction provided by law was revocation of the organization’s exempt 
status). 
 163  I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1) (2018). 
 164  Id. § 4958(c)(1)(A). 
 165  Id.; Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4958-1(e)(2), 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(B). 
 166  I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1).  Disqualified persons include “any person who was, at any time 
during the five-year period ending on the date of such transaction, in a position to exercise 
substantial influence over the affairs of the organization,” a family member of such a 
person, or an entity that is at least thirty-five percent controlled by disqualified persons.  Id.  
The regulations simplify the disqualified person test by creating three categories.  The first 
category, consisting of the president, CEO, COO, CFO, treasurer, voting members of the 
governing body, and others performing similar functions are automatically considered 
disqualified persons.  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c).  The second category, which includes 
organizations exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code and employees who receive less 
than the I.R.S. indexed amount for “highly compensated employees,” and are not otherwise 
considered disqualified persons, are automatically excluded from the definition of 
disqualified persons.  Id. § 53.4958-3(d)(1), (3).  The third category encompasses all other 
persons. In this catch-all category, all the facts and circumstances are considered in a 
determination of whether a person is disqualified.  Id. § 53.4958-3(e)(1). 
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rent-seeking and exempts most new recruits from outside the 
organization.167 
Intermediate sanctions consist of two tiers of taxation on the excess 
benefit amount.168  The initial tier is a twenty-five percent tax charged to 
the disqualified person169 and a ten percent tax charged to each organization 
manager who knowingly approved or acquiesced to the transaction.170  The 
second tier—a 200% tax on the excess benefit amount, payable by the 
disqualified person—applies if the charity does not correct the transaction 
before the I.R.S. assesses the initial tax.171  Correction generally involves 
reversing the transaction and restoring the charity to the position it would 
have occupied had the transaction never occurred.172  If the charity 
indemnifies the disqualified person or managers against intermediate 
sanctions, the I.R.S. will consider the amount of the indemnity to be 
additional compensation.173 
Charities that follow certain procedures are entitled to a rebuttable 
presumption that their transactions do not confer an excess benefit.174  
These procedures are: (i) approval by disinterested decision-makers; (ii) 
use of comparative data demonstrating that the transaction is market-rate; 
and (iii) concurrent documentation of the decision. 
First, the board (or a board-authorized committee) must approve the 
compensation in advance by a vote of its disinterested members.175  
Members must recuse themselves if they (i) will participate in or may 
economically benefit from the transaction; (ii) are in an employment 
relationship subject to the control of another disqualified person 
participating in or economically benefiting from the transaction; (iii) 
 
 167  Id. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(i).  The intermediate sanctions regime does not apply to fixed 
payments made pursuant to an initial contract so long as the compensated individual 
substantially performs his or her obligations under the contract.  Id.  A “fixed payment” may 
include contingencies based on objective criteria, including organization or activity 
revenues, but may not be subject to board discretion.  Id. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(ii)(A). 
 168  I.R.C. § 4958(a)-(b). 
 169  Id. § 4958(a)(1). 
 170  Id. § 4958(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(d)(3).  Managers may avoid liability if 
their participation was not willful and was due to reasonable cause.  I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2). 
 171  I.R.C. § 4958(b), (f)(5). 
 172  Id. § 4958(f)(6).  For example, a disqualified person who received an excessive 
salary would likely need to repay not only the excess amount, but also any interest that the 
organization would have earned on the excess amount had it been invested rather than paid 
to the disqualified person. 
 173  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(B)(2)(i).  State law generally permits such 
indemnification so long as the individuals acted in good faith.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 145(a) (2011); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 722(a) (McKinney 2014); CAL. 
CORP. CODE § 5238 (West 2012). 
 174  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a). 
 175  Id. §§ 53.4958-6(a)(1), 6(c)(1)(i). 
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receive compensation or other benefits subject to the approval of the 
disqualified person; (iv) have a material financial interest in the 
compensation arrangement; or (v) approve the compensation of a 
disqualified person who has or will approve the member’s compensation.176  
These rules are designed to prevent the quid pro quo approval of 
compensation among insiders. 
Second, the governing body must base its decision on information 
demonstrating that the compensation is fair market value.177  Generally, this 
means data showing that comparable organizations provide similar 
compensation for similar services.178  Comparability is based on a range of 
factors, including geographical region, organization size, and the nature of 
its services.179  Crucially, comparable organizations need not be tax-
exempt.180  Small organizations, with annual receipts normally less than $1 
million, need only to identify three comparable organizations that pay 
similar compensation in order to take advantage of the presumption of 
reasonableness.181  Larger organizations generally rely on salary surveys 
compiled by independent firms, but may also use “actual written offers 
from similar institutions competing for [the candidate’s] services.”182  
Relevant information may also include the availability of similar services 
in the organization’s geographic area (i.e., whether the organization needs 
to offer enough to entice a candidate—frequently a physician—to 
relocate).183  The rules expressly permit the governing body to decide that 
reasonable compensation falls above (or below) the range of the 
comparability data, so long as it records the basis for this decision.184 
Finally, the governing body must fully and concurrently document its 
decision,185 including the members who were present and voting, the 
comparability data and how it was obtained, and any actions taken to 
manage conflicts of interest.186  Documentation must occur within sixty 
days and be deemed accurate by the decision-making body within a 
reasonable time thereafter.187  An organization that complies with these 
steps will enjoy a presumption of reasonable compensation that can only be 
 
 176  Id. §§ 53.4958-6(a)(1), 6(c)(1)(iii). 
 177  Id. § 53.4958-6(a). 
 178  Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i). 
 179  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i). 
 180  Id. 
 181  Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(ii). 
 182  Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i). 
 183  Id. 
 184  Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(ii). 
 185  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(3). 
 186  Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(i); § 53.4958-6(c)(3)–(ii). 
 187  Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(ii). 
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overcome through an I.R.S. examination. 
2. Private Foundations 
Private foundations may face penalties for excessive compensation 
under the Code’s self-dealing rules.188  Section 4941 prohibits transactions 
between a private foundation and its disqualified persons, but exempts 
compensation “for personal services which are reasonable and necessary to 
carrying out the exempt purpose . . . if the compensation (or payment or 
reimbursement) is not excessive.”189  Section 4941 defines excessive 
compensation in accordance with Section 162, which governs the 
deductibility of for-profit business expenses.190  Unlike the public charity 
regime, Section 4941 offers no procedural safe harbor or initial contract 
exception. 
Like the intermediate sanctions rules for public charities, the Code 
imposes two tiers of self-dealing penalties on private foundations.  Under 
the first tier, the self-dealer must pay a ten percent tax on the excess 
compensation for each year until the self-dealing is corrected or discovered 
by the I.R.S..191  Managers complicit in the self-dealing must pay a five 
percent tax for each applicable year unless their participation was not 
willful and was due to reasonable cause.192  If the I.R.S. detects the self-
dealing before it has been corrected,193 the self-dealer and complicit 
managers are liable for taxes of 200% and 50%, respectively.194  Manager 
liability is joint and several, but capped at an aggregate $20,000 for any act 
of self-dealing.195  Foundations thus work within a similar legal framework 
for compensation as their public charity counterparts, but cannot access the 
rebuttable presumption that compensation is reasonable. 
B. Regulatory Enforcement Regime Assessment 
The regulatory enforcement regime uses market rate as its metric for 
reasonable compensation, defining the market to include comparable 
exempt and non-exempt entities.  This metric gives charities discretion to 
make fact-specific compensation decisions, as well as woo for-profit 
 
 188  I.R.C. § 4941 (2018). 
 189  Id. §§ 4941(a)(1), (d)(2)(E).  “Disqualified person” is defined more narrowly in 
Section 4941 than under Section 4958, encompassing only managers, substantial 
contributors, and their related businesses and family members.  Id. § 4941.  There is no 
catchall category for other influential persons. 
 190  Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-3(c)(1) (referring to Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7). 
 191  I.R.C. §§ 4941(a)(1), (e)(1). 
 192  Id. § 4941(a)(2). 
 193  Id. §§ 4941(b), (e)(1). 
 194  Id. §§ 4941(b)(1)–(2). 
 195  Id. §§ 4941(c)(1)–(2). 
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executives with competitive remuneration.  In short, it recognizes the 
reality of a diverse set of organizations with unique needs.  Additionally, 
the procedural safe harbor encourages charities to address the governance 
failures that impair charities’ ability to set appropriate compensation in the 
first place. 
Despite these strengths, the framework presents normative and 
practical challenges.  First, the market rate metric creates a self-
perpetuating spiral of inflated compensation that has little to do with 
performance or economic conditions.  Second, analogizing to the for-profit 
sector is inappropriate due to cross-sector differences in the components of 
compensation.  Third, enforcement is labor-intensive and impractical.  This 
section addresses each problem in turn. 
1. The Market Rate Metric 
The market rate metric for reasonable compensation facilitates a cycle 
of ever-increasing pay.  This generally occurs through two practices: (i) 
pegging the executive’s pay to the higher end of the market range on the 
grounds that the executive is above average; and (ii) opportunistically 
selecting comparability data for higher pay.  As this process repeats, “the 
inflated compensatory arrangements become market rate, and salaries 
continue to soar.”196 
The first practice consists of targeting executive compensation above 
the market median.  In large organizations that use salary survey data, 
directors frequently consider their executives to be above average and peg 
compensation to the higher end of the market compensation band.197  One 
hospital survey revealed routine attempts to keep CEOs in the top twenty-
five percent of the market data.198  A similar dynamic occurs in the for-
profit sector: when for-profit firms perform well, compensation consultants 
suggest performance-based compensation above the industry average,199 
and when they perform poorly, consultants nevertheless argue for 
compensation that reflects prevailing pay in the industry.200  One study 
found that the “vast majority of the firms that use peer groups target pay 
 
 196  Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 740 (2007). 
 197  Ben Gose & Marisa López-Rivera, Nonprofit CEO Pay Won’t See Big Gains in 
2012, Say Experts, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Sept. 20, 2012), https://www.philanthropy.com/ 
article/Nonprofit-CEO-Pay-Won-t-Rise/156113; see also Alan M. Cantor, Nice Work If You 
Can Get It: Why Foundation CEOs Are Overpaid, INSIDE PHILANTHROPY (May 3, 2016), 
http://www.insidephilanthropy.com/home/2016/5/3/nice-work-if-you-can-get-it-why-
foundation-ceos-are-overpaid.html#.  
 198  Gose & López-Rivera, supra note 197. 
 199  Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 79. 
 200  Id. 
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levels at or above the 50th percentile.”201 
The safe harbor rules for public charities permit such above-median 
targeting so long as the charity records the basis for its decision.202  This 
latitude may be advantageous where the charity differs in important 
respects from its peer group or the executive brings unique skills and 
expertise. Yet while there may be good reasons to target compensation 
above the median in certain cases, the prevalence of this practice suggests 
that other organizational and behavioral dynamics may be at work. The 
literature on public companies suggests a few possible explanations for this 
“Lake Wobegon effect,” a term coined for radio host Garrison Keillor’s 
mythical Minnesota town where “all children are above average.”203 
Directors may be reluctant to insult and demotivate executives who believe 
themselves to be above average with median or below-median pay.204 
Boards also believe that positioning their executives in the top half of their 
peer group affects market perceptions of firm value.205  The charitable 
sector may have an analogous tendency to see executive pay as a signal to 
certain donors (particularly high-net worth and institutional donors) that an 
organization is professional, well-managed, and financially sound. 
The second practice that inflates compensation is the opportunistic 
selection of peer groups.  This has been observed in the for-profit sector, 
where compensation committees select peer firms that are larger and 
perform more strongly.206  Mandatory peer group disclosure, which the 
SEC sometimes requires, 207 appears to restrain this tendency somewhat but 
not entirely.208  Charities do not have any analogous requirement to 
disclose their peer groups unless faced with an I.R.S. examination.  Smaller 
charities, which only need to identify three comparable compensation 
arrangements to take advantage of the safe harbor, may be particularly 
 
 201  John M. Bizjak et. al., Does the Use of Peer Groups Contribute to Higher Pay and 
Less Efficient Compensation?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 152, 153 (2008). 
 202  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(ii) (2019). 
 203  See, e.g., Are CEOs Worth Their Salaries?, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2002), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2002/10/02/are-ceos-worth-their-
salaries/e548ce2d-b69e-418a-84eb-096d81942759/; Adam Bryant, Earning It; Flying High 
on the Option Express, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/05/bus 
iness/earning-it-flying-high-on-the-option-express.html?pagewanted=all; Peter Whoriskey, 
The “Lake Wobegon Effect” Lifts CEOs’ Pay, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2011, at A1. 
 204  Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Executive Superstars, Peer Groups, and 
Overcompensation: Cause, Effect, and Solution, 38 J. CORP. L. 487, 521 (2013). 
 205  Rachel M. Hayes & Scott Schaefer, CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect, 94 J. 
FIN. ECON. 280, 281 (2009).  
 206  See John Bizjak et. al., Are All CEOs Above Average? An Empirical Analysis of 
Compensation Peer Groups and Pay Design, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 538, 539 (2011).  
 207  17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(2)(xiv) (2019). 
 208  Bizjak et. al., supra note 206, at 539. 
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tempted to identify above-average compensation arrangements.209 
2. The For-Profit Analogue 
Public charities may justify their compensation levels based on those 
of exempt and non-exempt organizations—including for-profit companies.  
While experts generally advise against relying exclusively on for-profit 
comparability data,210 any inclusion is likely to skew the data upwards.211  
This may facilitate charity recruitment of business executives, but it also 
imports inapplicable components of for-profit compensation into the 
subsidized charitable sector. 
An ostensible benefit of the for-profit analogue is in allowing charities 
to compete for talent and attract high-caliber leadership.  Pay parity can 
help medical research charities recruit candidates from high-paying 
biotechnology firms, and foundations may find it easier to attract financial 
managers with for-profit banking and investment experience.  Yet the 
importance of matching for-profit pay should not be overstated.  Charity 
executives value their positions for a range of pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
reasons, including the gratification of charitable work.212  Despite the 
existing pay gap between the nonprofit and for-profit sectors, over two-
thirds of nonprofit executives report satisfaction with their 
compensation.213  Overwhelmingly, nonprofits report that executive 
retention is not a challenge, and only seven percent describe it as 
 
 209  Manny, supra note 196, at 740. 
 210  See, e.g., Gerald M. Griffith, The Dollars and Sense of Executive Compensation, 9 
COMPLIANCE TODAY 20, 25 (Apr. 2009), https://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/6c219 
3f4-d546-419e-99d8-fe2c13fb2a9d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/966d1b03-ffa9-
49e2-bbda-054707127416/ct0407_GriffithKing.pdf; Eileen Morgan Johnson, Executive 
Compensation for Exempt Organizations, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON, L.L.P. 3 (2006), 
http://www.wtplaw.com/sites/default/files/document_pdf/article/executive_compensation_f
or_exempt_organizations_2.pdf.  
 211  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Nonprofit Pay and Benefits: Estimates from the National 
Compensation Survey, MONTHLY LABOR REV. (Jan. 2016), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/20 
16/article/nonprofit-pay-and-benefits.htm (reporting a compensation differential of $4.67 
per hour between nonprofit and for-profit management and professional workers).  A study 
comparing charity and for-profit executive compensation would likely show a far greater 
difference. 
 212  Keep Charity Charitable, supra note 36, at 1223. 
 213  Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 211. (reporting an average compensation 
differential of $4.67 per hour between “management, professional, and related workers” in 
nonprofit and for-profits).  Because the nonprofit sector is broader than the charitable sector 
and includes, for example, political organizations and labor unions, this figure is likely to 
underestimate of the wage difference between charity and for-profit leaders.  Marla 
Cornelius, Demographics & Salary, DARING TO LEAD (June 13, 2011), http://daringtolead.or 
g/demographics/demographics-salary/.  Only ten percent of executives were “not at all” 
satisfied, which corresponds to the percentage of respondents earning less than $30,000.  Id.  
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“significantly challenging.”214  This suggests that while the ability to pay 
competitive rates may be an advantage, matching for-profit pay is generally 
not vital to attracting and retaining executive talent. 
For-profit compensation is a flawed analogue for charitable 
compensation due to cross-sector differences in the appropriate 
components of remuneration.  Three elements in particular are not 
transferable to the charitable sector: (i) profits distribution, which is 
forbidden to charities; (ii) cash premiums to compensate for the risk of 
accepting equity compensation, which has no application to charities; and 
(iii) unearned rents, which are normatively less acceptable in the charitable 
sector.  Because these components are not neatly labeled as such, it is 
virtually impossible to extricate them from the overall for-profit 
compensation amounts in order to determine appropriate charity 
compensation levels. 
Profits Distribution.  Charities are forbidden to allocate net earnings 
to executives or other insiders.  The prohibition on private inurement is 
strictly construed, precluding even executive compensation tied to 
organization revenues or other performance measures.215  Business 
compensation, on the other hand, is often inextricably tied to profits 
distribution.216  For-profit executives frequently receive a combination of 
base salary, benefits, bonuses, stock, and stock options.217  It would be 
convenient to presume that base pay represents the value of services while 
equity and bonuses represent profits distribution, but companies frequently 
switch between these forms of compensation based on exogenous factors.  
For example, the Great Recession prompted a surge in equity grant 
compensation, but businesses largely reverted to cash in 2014 amid fears 
that the market had peaked.218  This increase in cash compensation did not 
reflect an abrupt increase in the value of the executives’ services.  
Similarly, equity compensation skyrocketed in the 1990s after Congress 
enacted favorable tax treatment for performance-based remuneration,219 but 
the TCJA’s repeal of that provision has at least some companies 
 
 214 2013 Nonprofit Employment Trends Survey, NONPROFIT H.R. SOLUTIONS 21 (2013), 
http://www.nonprofithr.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/2013-Employment-Trends-
Survey-Report.pdf.  They overwhelmingly reported greater retention problems in low- and 
mid-level positions than in experienced and executive positions.  Id. at 19. 
 215  See World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 958, 968 (1983); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. 
Mem. 39,670 (Oct. 14, 1987). 
 216  Peter Frumkin & Alice Andre-Clark, Nonprofit Compensation and the Market, 21 
HAW. L. REV. 425, 465 (1999). 
 217  Jeppson et. al., supra note 79, at 83–84. 
 218  Theo Francis & Joann S. Lublin, CEOs Awarded More Cash Pay, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
21, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ceos-awarded-more-cash-pay-1429608602.   
 219  Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. 
ECON. POL’Y. 283, 289–91 (2005).  
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reconfiguring their compensation packages to increase base salaries and 
curb bonus arrangements.220  Profits distribution is not easily divisible from 
the rest of the compensation package, and using for-profit compensation as 
a benchmark risks incorporating profits distribution into charity 
compensation. 
Risk Premiums.  As discussed in Part III, optimal contracting theorists 
claim that providing equity compensation to executives necessitates an 
additional cash premium to offset the resulting non-diversification 
burden.221  This notion purported to explain why the 1990s spike in equity 
compensation was accompanied by an immense surge in cash 
compensation.222  To the extent that this explanation bears out, it has no 
application to the charitable sector.  Since charities cannot provide equity 
compensation, there is no rationale for a compensatory risk premium. 
Unearned Rents.  There is evidence to support the managerial power 
theory contention that executives extract at least some rents from for-profit 
businesses.223  To the extent that this occurs, such arrangements do not 
reflect reasonable compensation for services, but weaknesses in corporate 
governance and organizational dynamics.  Transferring the value of such 
arrangements wholesale to the charitable sector, as permitted by current 
regulations, would result in the diversion of taxpayer-subsidized charitable 
resources into the hands of private executives.  While rent extraction is sub-
optimal in any organization, including for-profit companies, it is 
normatively even less appropriate for charities due to their tax 
subsidization and the lack of recourse available to beneficiaries. 
3. Enforceability 
The I.R.S. does not—and will not for the foreseeable future—enforce 
the private inurement rules with sufficient vigor to secure compliance or 
even ascertain the scale of the problem.224  Because most charities can 
access the presumption of reasonable compensation by following simple 
procedures, regulatory enforcement involves a fact- and resource-intensive 
investigation.225  The I.R.S. must review the organization’s procedures and 
 
 220  Renae Merle, Skyrocketing Executive Pay Packages Are About to Become More 
Costly for Corporate America, WASH. POST. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.co 
m/news/business/wp/2018/01/03/skyrocketing-executive-pay-packages-are-about-to-
become-more-costly-for-corporate-america/?utm_term=.8c6bd3185598.   
 221  Hall & Murphy, supra note 74, at 5. 
 222  Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 219, at 291. 
 223  See, e.g., van Essen et. al., supra note 95, 183–84; Chongwoo Choe et. al., CEO 
Power and the Structure of CEO Pay, 35 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 237–48 (2014) (finding 
support for the managerial power theory in the relationship between power and pay). 
 224  G.A.O. Report, supra note 160, at 40–41. 
 225  See infra Part V. 
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comparability data, determine whether the organization is in fact entitled to 
the presumption, and, if so, amass sufficient rebuttal evidence to impose 
penalties.226  At present, I.R.S. resource constraints prevent this sort of 
investigation from occurring at a meaningful scale. 
The I.R.S. operates under ever-tightening budgetary constraints that 
have decimated enforcement.227  Between 2010 and 2016, its workforce 
shrank by 17,000 employees.228  In roughly the same period, funds for 
employee training declined by nearly seventy-five percent.229  These trends 
have particularly strained the enforcement capabilities of the Tax Exempt 
and Government Entities Division (TEGE).230  From 2011 to 2016, funding 
declined by twenty percent and staffing by twenty-seven percent.231  The 
rate of I.R.S. charity examinations is anemic and falling.232  In 2017, the 
I.R.S. examined just one-fifth of one percent of charity tax returns,233 and 
completed only 109 examinations of charities for private inurement 
issues.234  The examination rate is likely to further decline as the I.R.S. 
recognizes around 80,000 new charities each year.235 
 
 226  Id. 
 227  Chuck Marr & Cecile Murray, I.R.S. Funding Cuts Compromise Taxpayer Service 
and Weaken Enforcement, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Apr. 4, 2016), 
http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/irs-funding-cuts-compromise-taxpayer-service-
and-weaken-enforcement.  
 228  Hearing Before the Senate Fin. Comm., 114th Cong. 1 (2016) (written testimony of 
John A. Koskinen, Comm’r. of Internal Revenue), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/med 
ia/doc/2016%20JAK%20testimony%20SFC%20on%20FY17%20budget%20021016x.pdf. 
 229  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 86 (2017), https://taxp 
ayeradvocate.irs.gov/reports/2017-annual-report-to-congress/full-report. 
 230  See, e.g., Josh Hicks, Shrinking I.R.S. Struggles to Keep Pace with Growing Number 
of Tax-Exempt Charities, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/new 
s/federal-eye/wp/2015/01/09/shrinking-irs-struggles-to-keep-up-with-growing-number-of-
tax-exempt-charities/. 
 231  Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Fallout from Allegations of Tea Party Targeting Hamper 
I.R.S. Oversight of Nonprofits, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.co 
m/investigations/fallout-from-allegations-of-tea-party-targeting-hamper-irs-oversight-of-
nonprofits/2017/12/17/6403c1c0-c59e-11e7-a441-3a768c8586f1_story.html?utm_term=. 
5de5269dc993. 
 232  G.A.O. Report, supra note 160, at 1–2. 
 233  The I.R.S. examined 2,375 returns in fiscal year 2017.  Data Book, 2017, Pub. 55B, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 1, 34 (Mar. 2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/17databk.pdf.  
There were 1,286,181 recognized charities in this period.  Id. at 57. 
 234  Tax Exempt and Government Entities FY 2017 Accomplishments, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV. 1, 3–4 (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/tege_fy2017_acco 
mplishments.pdf.  Three of these examinations resulted in revocation.  Id.  It is unknown 
how many resulted in financial penalties.  
 235  FY2017 had 79,699 approvals. Data Book, 2017, Pub. 55B, supra note 233, at 52.  
FY2016 had 79,545 approvals.  Data Book, 2016, Pub. 55B, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 1, 
52 (Mar. 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/16databk.pdf. FY2015 had 86,915 
approvals.  Data Book, 2015, Pub. 55B, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 1, 54 (Mar. 2016), 
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In response to resource constraints and the political fallout of 
allegations that the TEGE unfairly targeted conservative organizations for 
scrutiny,236 the TEGE has turned to technology to guide its review of 
charities.237 The TEGE has also begun implementing a data-driven process 
of selecting charities to examine.238  Rather than targeting particular sub-
sectors based on the perceived prevalence of abuse, the TEGE will use data 
analytics to identify likely violations from Form 990 responses and 
discrepancies.239  It is not yet known whether data-driven targeting of 
examinations will offset the decline in trained examiners and examinations.  
Previous attempts at streamlining exempt organization oversight have not 
been an unqualified success.  In 2014, the TEGE introduced a dramatically 
simplified online application for exemption,240 which the I.R.S.’s own 
studies show has resulted in an erroneous approval rate of over forty 
percent.241  Even if the TEGE’s analytic targeting is effective in identifying 
likely violators, it will still need to conduct a time- and labor-intensive 
examination to rebut the presumption of reasonableness and impose 
sanctions. If current trends in I.R.S. funding persist, charities are unlikely 
to face accountability through this mechanism. 
VI. THIRD MECHANISM: THE TCJA EXCISE TAX 
The third constraint on compensation is the TCJA’s across-the-board 
excise tax on remuneration in excess of $1 million.  In some respects, this 
is the most promising measure to date, offering a consistently enforceable 
 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15databk.pdf. 
 236  The “I.R.S. targeting scandal” alleged that the TEGE unfairly targeted groups 
affiliated with the Tea Party movement that applied for tax exemption under Section 
501(c)(4) of the Code. Some conservative commentators likened the accusations to 
Watergate and called for abolition of the agency. O’Harrow, supra note 231. 
 237  Ruth McCambridge & Virginia Gross, Changes in the I.R.S. Oversight of Nonprofits: 
A Conversation with Virginia Gross, NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 8, 2016), https://nonprofitquarterl 
y.org/2016/08/08/changes-irs-501-c-3-oversight-nonprofits/.  The targeting scandal involved 
the I.R.S. applying disproportionate scrutiny to “tea party” advocacy organizations as they 
proliferated in 2013. 
 238  McCambridge & Gross, supra note 237.   
 239  Id.   
 240  Form 1023-EZ is permitted for organizations that project average annual revenues of 
no more than $50,000 for their first three years and meet a variety of other standards.  2017 
Annual Report to Congress, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV. 1, 64 n.2 (2017), 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017-ARC/ARC17_Volume1_ 
MSP_05_ExemptOrganizations.pdf.  By the third quarter of 2017, sixty-four percent of 
applications were submitted on Form 1023-EZ.  Id. at 64 n.5. 
 241  Id. at 65.  This figure was calculated by reviewing the articles of incorporation of 
organizations in the 24 states that post them online.  In 2015-16, forty-six percent of 
organizations that successfully submitted the streamlined application did not even meet the 
basic “organizational test” for 501(c)(3) status.  This test is based exclusively on the 
language in the organization’s paperwork.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1).  
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mechanism of accountability that upholds the purpose of the tax exemption 
while preserving some charity discretion.  The metric for imposing the tax, 
however, is arbitrary and untethered to any meaningful measure of 
reasonableness or performance. 
A. Excise Tax Regime Overview 
Under the TCJA, charities must pay the standard corporate tax rate of 
twenty-one percent on all remuneration to any “covered employee” over $1 
million, including any parachute payments and remuneration paid by 
related organizations.242  Covered employees include the five highest-
compensated employees in the present tax year or any preceding tax year 
after December 31, 2016.243  The Code creates an exception for 
compensation paid to procure the services of licensed medical and 
veterinary professionals,244 perhaps in recognition of the high cost of luring 
these professionals to underserved rural areas.  At the time of publication, 
the I.R.S. had not yet finalized regulations to govern implementation of the 
excise tax. 
In enacting the excise tax, Congress created symmetry with the 
compensation rules for publicly held corporations under Section 162(m) of 
the Code.  While businesses may generally deduct from their taxable 
income “a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for 
personal services actually rendered[,]”245 Section 162(m) forbids publicly 
traded corporations from deducting compensation amounts over $1 million 
paid to covered employees,246 including the CEO and four other highest-
paid officers.247 
B. Excise Tax Regime Assessment 
It is too early to determine whether the TCJA excise tax will actually 
affect compensation levels.  Its for-profit analogue, Section 162(m), has 
failed to curtail executive pay in the quarter-century since its enactment.248  
Observers have often attributed this failure to Section 162(m)’s broad 
exception for performance-based compensation.249  This exception, which 
 
 242  I.R.C. §§ 4960(a), (c)(4) (2018).  
 243  Id. § 4960(c)(2). 
 244  Id. § 4960(c)(3)(B). 
 245  Id. § 162(a)(1). 
 246  Id. § 162(m). 
 247  See id. § 162(m)(3). 
 248  See Meegan Reilly, Former Treasury Official Discusses Executive Compensation 
Cap, 62 TAX NOTES 747 (1994) (noting that while the law generates $2.5 billion in annual 
tax revenue, its stated goal was to reduce executive compensation). 
 249  Executive Compensation: Backdating to the Future: Hearing Before the Senate 
Committee on Finance, 109th Cong. 37 (2006) (closing statement of Senator Chuck 
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was repealed by the TCJA, covered commissions based on income directly 
attributable to the individual’s performance.250  It also covered any other 
pay based on the achievement of objectively measurable performance 
goals, so long as an independent board committee and the shareholders 
approved the arrangement in advance.251  In the aftermath of Section 
162(m)’s passage, equity skyrocketed from thirty-seven percent to fifty-
five percent of total executive compensation.252  At the same time, cash 
compensation boomed nearly forty percent,253 which optimal contracting 
theorists justify as a “non-diversification premium,” and managerial power 
theorists ascribe to rent extraction.254 
Even discounting the now-repealed exception for performance-based 
compensation, Section 162(m) does not appear to have achieved the 
intended effect.  Perversely, some smaller companies increased their 
compensation to the $1 million limit because Section 162(m) nudged 
perceptions of reasonableness upward.255  Others forewent the deduction 
and continued to compensate executives in excess of the ceiling.256 
It is plausible that the TCJA cap may likewise fail to curb 
overcompensation, but this does not necessarily render the excise tax 
mechanism ineffectual.  Even if it does little to curtail compensation levels, 
it will nevertheless provide a measure of accountability for use of the 
501(c)(3) exemption.257  The excise tax mechanism effectively treats 
charity income used to provide excessive compensation as non-exempt.  
This mirrors the treatment of charity earnings from commercial activities: 
if a commercial activity does not “contribute importantly” to the charity’s 
 
Grassley), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/090606cga.pdf.  Sen. Grassley, 
then serving as Chair of the Senate Committee on Finance, described the law as “broken” 
and having “more holes than Swiss cheese.”  Id. 
 250  I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(B) (repealed 2017).. 
 251  Id. § 162(m)(4)(C) (repealed 2017). 
 252  Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 219, at 289–91.   
 253  Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 219, at 291.   
 254  Hall & Murphy, supra note 74, at 5; Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 219, at 301.  
 255  David G. Harris & Jane R. Livingstone, Federal Tax Legislation as an Implicit 
Contracting Cost Benchmark: The Definition of Excessive Executive Compensation, 77 
ACCT. REV. 997, 997 (2002); John Byrne, That’s Some Pay Cap, Bill, BUS. WK. (Apr. 24, 
1994), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1994-04-24/thats-some-pay-cap-bill. 
 256  Steven Balsam & Qin Jennifer Yin, Explaining Firm Willingness to Forfeit Tax 
Deductions Under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m): The Million Dollar Cap, 24 J. 
ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 300, 321 (2005).  Their willingness to do so depends on a variety of 
factors, including shareholder lobbying, the cost of restructuring compensation 
arrangements, and whether the loss of the deduction will actually and immediately result in 
more tax liability.  Present Law & Background Related to Executive Compensation, JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 1, 6 (Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.jct.gov/x-39-06.pdf. 
 257  The excise tax does not completely negate the Section 501(c)(3) tax advantage with 
respect to that income, as it may still be deductible to the donor.  
ROGAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2019  4:54 PM 
488 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:449 
exempt purposes, its net proceeds are generally subject to UBIT.258  Both 
the TCJA excise tax and UBIT evince the principle that charities warrant 
tax exemption only to the extent that they behave like charities.259  When 
charities behave like conventional businesses, they cannot take advantage 
of preferential tax treatment.  Similarly, to the extent that charities pay 
excessive compensation to their executives, they should not benefit from 
preferential tax treatment.  The excise tax therefore upholds both charities’ 
discretion to make fact-specific compensation decisions and Congress’s 
intent that the taxpayer subsidy be used for charitable outputs rather than 
private gain. 
The ceiling on tax-advantaged compensation also has the benefit of 
enforceability.  Unlike the public disclosure regime, which is hindered by 
the donor information and outrage deficits, and the regulatory enforcement 
regime, which relies on fact-intensive individual examinations, the TCJA 
excise tax is easily administered.  Charities have clear directions, and the 
I.R.S. can easily detect noncompliance.  The I.R.S. may still investigate 
cases of suspected private inurement and revoke the exemption altogether, 
but this is no longer the only source of accountability.  The TCJA excise 
tax assures the public that charities face certain consequences for the 
egregious diversion of their resources. 
The most salient weakness of the excise tax mechanism is its failure to 
offer a meaningful metric for reasonable compensation.  It imports the 
arbitrary $1 million limitation of Section 162(m), which originated from 
the early 1990s trend of executive salaries topping the million-dollar 
mark.260  It also fails to impose accountability for excessive compensation 
beneath the million-dollar ceiling.  While it may capture certain egregious 
cases of overcompensation, it does not go far enough in ensuring that 
public subsidies are devoted exclusively to the public good. 
 
 258  Unrelated business income tax applies to the net income from a trade or business that 
is regularly carried on and is not substantially related to the organization’s exempt purposes.  
I.R.C. § 511(1) (2018); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (2019).  A trade or business is substantially 
related to an organization’s exempt purposes if it contributes importantly to the 
accomplishment of those purposes.  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d).  
 259  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b). 
 260  Ryan Miske, Can’t Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to 
Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1688 
(2004). Legislative history does not reveal any clear rationale for the selection of the $1 
million figure, but it may have been a response to the trajectory of executive compensation 
in the early 1990s—rising from $624,996 in 1980 to $1.9 million in 1990. Linda Levine, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., A Comparison of the Pay of Top Executives and Other 
Workers 3-4 (2004), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1181 
&context=key_workplace.  
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VII. BEYOND THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 
With the enactment of the TCJA excise tax, the law now offers three 
legal mechanisms to constrain charity compensation.  Taken together, they 
impose a piecemeal accountability, likely to affect only the few charities 
that fall into the media’s crosshairs, are individually examined by the 
I.R.S., or pay over $1 million to their top executives. 
The general construct of the excise tax provides the most promising 
oversight framework.  It offers a consistently enforceable system, latitude 
for charity leaders to make decisions based on their specific circumstances, 
and accountability for the use of the charitable tax exemption.  Its primary 
weakness is the failure to offer a meaningful metric for determining 
whether compensation should be tax-advantaged.  This Part examines the 
metrics used by two analogous regulatory frameworks—first, for public 
sector pay, and second, for compensation of bankruptcy trustees—and their 
respective transferability to the charitable sector.  The overall goal of this 
inquiry is to align the regulatory system with the policy purpose of the 
charitable exemption; that is, to ensure that tax subsidies further exempt 
purposes rather than private enrichment.  This Part then suggests a 
synthesis of these frameworks that could improve compensation metrics in 
the charitable sector, and proposes avenues for further research. 
A. Public Sector Metric 
Given the weakness of the for-profit analogue, a potential alternative 
is to benchmark executive compensation in the charitable sector against 
that of public-sector employees.  This idea is not new—state proposals to 
limit executive compensation frequently invoke the pay levels of 
government officials.261  A Florida bill, for example, aimed to restrict 
nonprofit employees to the salary of the highest-paid statewide official 
unless the organization received special dispensation from the state budget 
commission.262  Such comparisons have intuitive appeal, since the public 
sector, like charities, receives public subsidies and operates for the purpose 
 
 261  In 2016, lawsuits thwarted ballot initiatives in California and Arizona to limit 
hospital executive compensation to that of the U.S. President.  See Howard Fischer, 
Hospital Pay Cap Initiative Won’t Be on November Ballot, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Aug. 16, 
2016), http://tucson.com/news/state-and-regional/hospital-pay-cap-initiative-won-t-be-on-
november-ballot/article_366ae68c-0a9b-5b7e-895a-e4c839a26e55.html; John Myers, 
Healthcare Workers Union Is Withdrawing Its November Initiative on Hospital CEO 
Salaries, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-essential-
politics-healthcare-workers-union-is-pulling-its-1467156556-htmlstory.html. 
 262  S. 596, 2012 Leg. Session (Fla. 2012), https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2012/0 
596/BillText/c1/HTML; see H.R. 545, 2012 Leg. Session (Fla. 2012), 
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2012/0545/BillText/Filed/PDF (corresponding bill). 
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of providing socially beneficial goods.263 
1. Overview 
Federal employees are generally compensated in accordance with 
“their rank in a pay schedule.”264  The General Schedule (“GS”), which 
covers a majority of federal employees,265 consists of fifteen grade levels, 
with ten salary steps within each grade.266  Nationwide standards determine 
the grade of a given position based on its complexity, responsibility, and 
prerequisite levels of education and experience.267  Employees generally 
receive salary step increases in accordance with a standardized timeline—
annually for steps one to three, biennially for steps four to six, and 
triennially for steps seven to nine.268  They can also ascend salary steps 
through exceptional performance, or “quality steps,” and receive annual 
bonuses that boost their compensation for a particular year of strong 
performance.269  Locality payments are intended to adjust the federal pay 
scale to account for the local cost of living in forty-seven geographical 
areas.270  Generous benefits, including health and retirement plans,271 
constitute approximately thirty-nine percent of total federal 
compensation.272 
 
 
 263  For this reason, there is a level of public accountability and transparency regarding 
public sector salaries that is not generally seen in the for-profit world.  See Josh Hicks, New 
Web Site Allows Easy Salary Spying on Federal Workers, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2013/08/16/new-web-site-allows-
easy-salary-spying-on-federal-workers/. 
 264  Comparing the Compensation of Federal and Private-Sector Employees, CONG. 
BUDGET OFFICE 1, 15 (Jan. 2012), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/42921. 
 265  Id. 
 266  General Schedule Classification and Pay, OFFICE PERSONNEL MGMT., 
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/pay-systems/general-schedule/ (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
 267  See id. 
 268  Id. 
 269  Id. 
 270  Id. 
 271  The Federal Employees Retirement System (“FERS”) allows employees who have 
completed five years of service to receive a portion of their salary upon retirement, 
calculated as one percent of their highest three-year average salary multiplied by years of 
service.  Enhanced benefits are available for certain employees, including law enforcement 
officers and firefighters.  After retirees turn 62, their payout is somewhat adjusted for cost of 
living, giving them some protection against inflation.  FERS also includes the equivalent of 
a 401(k) in the Thrift Savings Plan, which matches 100% the first three percent of employee 
contributions and fifty percent of contributions for the next two percent. FERS Information, 
OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, https://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/fers-information/ (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
 272  Comparing the Compensation of Federal and Private-Sector Employees, supra note 
264, at 9. 
ROGAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2019  4:54 PM 
2019] BEYOND THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 491 
In general, non-GS employees have more variable and higher average 
compensation than GS employees,273 but may not receive locality pay.274  
The Executive Schedule establishes pay rates for Cabinet members, non-
Cabinet agency directors, deputy heads of agencies, chairpersons of federal 
commissions and boards, and specified lower-level executives.275  The 
Senior Executive Service consists of employees in designated leadership 
positions across federal agencies.276  Agencies have latitude in awarding 
performance bonuses for these positions,277 but compensation is subject to 
an aggregate limit of the Vice President’s total pay.278  As of January 2019, 
this limitation was $243,500.279  A similar non-GS system governs the 
compensation of specialized research scientists.280 
The public sector has long grappled with the balance between 
attracting talent and responsibly stewarding taxpayer money.  By law, the 
federal government seeks to provide pay parity with non-federal 
employment (i.e., in state and local government as well as the private 
sector).281  The Congressional Budget Office has found that the difference 
 
 273  Characteristics and Pay of Federal Civilian Employees, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE 1, 9 
(Mar. 2007), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/03-
15-federal_personnel.pdf. 
 274  Continuation of Locality Payments for Non-General Schedule Employees, THE 
PRESIDENT’S PAY AGENT (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-
leave/salaries-wages/2018/continuation-of-locality-payments-for-non-general-schedule-
employees-november-9-2018.pdf. 
 275  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 5312, 5313 (2018). 
 276  Id. § 3132(a)(2) (A senior executive is a non-presidential appointee who “directs the 
work of an organizational unit[,] is held accountable for the success of one or more specific 
programs or projects[,] [ . . . ] supervises the work of employees other than personal 
assistants[,] or otherwise exercises important policy-making, policy-determining, or other 
executive functions[.]”); Id. § 3132(a)(3).  SES positions are designated by agencies “in 
accordance with [OPM] guidelines.”  5 C.F.R. § 214.202(a) (2019). 
 277  Each agency must develop a performance management system and appoint a 
performance review board to ensure the integrity of bonus decisions.  5 C.F.R. § 430.304(a).  
Federal regulations set forth requirements for performance criteria, monitoring, and 
assessment.  See 5 C.F.R. §§ 430.305–09.  Performance awards are between five and twenty 
percent of the executive’s basic pay.  Senior Executive Service Compensation, OFFICE OF 
PERSONNEL MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/senior-executive-service/co 
mpensation/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).  
 278  3 U.S.C. § 104(a) (establishing the Vice President’s per annum salary rate); 5 C.F.R. 
§ 530.202 (defining “aggregate limitation” as the Vice President’s total annual 
compensation under 3 U.S.C. § 104).  
 279  Exec. Order No. 13,856, 85 Fed. Reg. 65 (Dec. 28, 2018). 
 280  5 C.F.R. §534(e).  
 281  The Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-509, § 529, 104 
Stat. 1389 (1990), declared it the policy of Congress with respect to the General Schedule 
for “[f]ederal pay rates [to] be comparable with non-Federal pay rates for the same levels of 
work within the same local pay area” and “any existing pay disparities between Federal and 
non-Federal employees should be completely eliminated.”  5 U.S.C. §§ 5301(3)–(4).  This 
statement applies specifically to GS employees, who account for over sixty percent of the 
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between GS and private-sector salaries depends on educational attainment.  
Compared to the private sector, federal employees without a bachelor’s 
degree earn higher salaries (by twenty-one percent), those with a bachelor’s 
degree earn equivalent salaries, and those with an advanced degree earn 
lower salaries (by twenty-three percent).282  Due to generous government 
benefits, however, federal employees with a bachelor’s degree earn fifteen 
percent more in total compensation, and the differential for those with 
advanced degrees drops to eighteen percent.283  Federal employment 
therefore imposes a higher opportunity cost for those credentialed 
individuals who are more likely to fill executive positions in the private 
sector. 
2. Metric Assessment 
Public sector pay offers a well-developed, location- and skill-specific 
metric that is designed to balance the need for talent with responsibility for 
taxpayer money.  The Senior Executive Service scale provides a rough 
analogue to the skills and responsibilities of charity executives.  Moreover, 
the public and charitable sectors have similar goals of furthering public 
welfare.  Unlike the for-profit sector, which is systematically (if 
imperfectly) accountable to shareholders, the public and charitable sectors 
are held accountable primarily through government ombudsmen, 
regulators, and occasional episodes of media-driven public outrage.  The 
public-sector analogue is also more appropriate than the for-profit analogue 
because it does not permit profits distribution, does not incentivize risk-
taking, and does not have some of the features facilitate rent extraction. 
Despite these advantages, using federal compensation as an analogue 
for reasonable charity compensation would pose considerable challenges.  
First, federal employees of all education levels enjoy more job security 
than private sector workers,284 due to both the stability of taxpayer 
financing285 and constitutional protections against arbitrary dismissal.286  
 
federal workforce.  Comparing the Compensation of Federal and Private-Sector Employees, 
supra note 264, at 15. 
 282  Comparing the Compensation of Federal and Private-Sector Employees, supra note 
264, at viii. 
 283  Comparing the Compensation of Federal and Private-Sector Employees, supra note 
264, at ix. 
 284  Jason L. Kopelman & Harvey S. Rosen, Are Public Sector Jobs Recession Proof? 
Were They Ever?, 44 PUB. FIN. REV. 370, 382–84 (2016) (finding federal employees 4.2% 
“less likely to lose their jobs than private sector workers,” and between 5.3–6.5% less likely 
to lose their jobs during a recession); id. at 389 (finding slightly smaller gap in job loss 
probability for those with a college degree).   
 285  Id. at 389. 
 286  In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, the Supreme Court held that public 
sector employees have a property interest in their employment and therefore a Constitutional 
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Charity executives would rationally demand higher compensation to offset 
greater job risk.287  Second, it may be impracticable for charities to either 
identify comparable federal positions or apply the complex federal wage 
determination system.  The federal government relies on an expensive 
bureaucracy to administer the system, which is not a luxury available to 
most charities.288  Enforcement, too, would be difficult, as the I.R.S. would 
need to individually determine whether charities had appropriately applied 
the federal pay scale. 
B. Expenditure-Based Formula 
Another model that merits consideration is a compensation ceiling 
tied to the amount of charitable work conducted by the organization.  This 
would resemble the compensation framework for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
trustees, whose legal duty resembles that of charity executives and whose 
maximum compensation is linked to payments in furtherance of that duty. 
1. Overview 
Chapter 11 trustees oversee reorganization bankruptcies wherein the 
entity continues to operate but agrees to repay all or a portion of its 
outstanding debt in accordance with a court-approved payment plan.289  
The appointment of a trustee is rare, typically reserved for cases of gross 
mismanagement, dishonesty, or fraud by the current management.290  In 
addition to regular trustee responsibilities, which include investigating the 
debtor’s financial situation,291 identifying and reporting any 
 
entitlement to due process before termination.  470 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1985). 
 287  See Florian S. Peters & Alexander F. Wagner, The Executive Turnover Risk 
Premium, 69 J. FIN. 1529, 1556 (2014).   
 288  The Office of Personnel Management reported that the cost of administering the 
federal wage system was approximately $5.8 million in the 2001 fiscal year.  The report was 
prepared at the direction of the House Committee on Appropriations, and does not appear to 
have been replicated in the subsequent years.  OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, REPORT 
TO CONGRESS: COST OF ADMINISTERING THE FEDERAL WAGE SYSTEM (March 2002), 
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/pay-systems/federal-wage-
system/reports-to-congress/cost-of-administering-the-federal-wage-system/#wagesurveys. 
 289  11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(1)–(5), 1129(a) (2018).  In contrast, when a business 
undergoes Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy, all assets are sold, the proceeds go to repay 
creditors, and the business ceases to operate.  Id. § 726(a).  The court may authorize the 
trustee to continue operating the business for a limited period of time if it determines that 
continued operations are in the best interest of the estate and consistent with orderly 
liquidation.  Id. § 721.  
 290  11 U.S.C. § 1104(a); In re Texasoil Enterprises, Inc., 296 B.R. 431, 435 (N.D. Tex. 
2003) (calling the appointment of a trustee “draconian and correspondingly rare.”). In most 
cases, the debtor-in-possession assumes the duties of a trustee, but without entitlement to 
compensation under the scheme described in this Part. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1108. 
 291  Id. § 1106(a)(3).   
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mismanagement or irregularities,292 and formulating and implementing a 
payment plan,293 a Chapter 11 trustee may also operate the debtor’s 
business.294  This expansive role encompasses “services similar to those 
that would be provided by a corporate executive, such as a chairman of the 
board and chief executive officer.”295 
Trustees have fiduciary obligations similar to those of charity 
executives.  While federal statutes do not clearly explain the trustee’s 
standard of conduct,296 beyond providing that a trustee must serve as “the 
representative of the estate”297 and “be accountable for all property 
received,”298 courts have consistently held that bankruptcy trustees owe 
fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries of estates.299  Generally, these duties 
include the duty of care (i.e., to not act negligently), the duty of loyalty 
(i.e., to not act in the trustee’s own interests), and the duty of obedience 
(i.e., to not act outside the fiduciary’s designated authority).300  Trustees 
must observe these duties in the course of allocating and distributing assets 
to creditors.  Their fundamental responsibility parallels that of charity 
directors and officers—to ensure that a particular pool of assets is used 
exclusively for designated purposes. 
Bankruptcy courts may award trustees “reasonable compensation for 
actual, necessary services rendered,” as well as “reimbursement for actual, 
necessary expenses.”301  The amount may be set on an hourly, fixed, 
percentage, or contingency basis.302  The law forbids compensation for 
 
 292  Id. § 1106(a)(4).   
 293  Id. § 1106(a)(5).   
 294  Id. §1108.   
 295  In re Marvel Entm’t Grp., Inc., 234 B.R. 21, 42 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).   
 296  See Elizabeth H. McCullough, Bankruptcy Trustee Liability: Is There a Method in 
the Madness?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 156 (2011). 
 297  11 U.S.C. § 323(a).  
 298  Id. §§ 704(a)(2), 1106(a)(1).   
 299  Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985) 
(“[T]he fiduciary duty of the trustee runs to shareholders as well as to creditors.”); Flugence 
v. Axis Surplus Ins. Co. (In re Flugence), 738 F.3d 126, 131 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Because the 
trustee is the fiduciary of the estate, he has a duty to ensure that the compensation 
arrangements made with attorneys and others are in the best interests of the creditors.”); Dye 
v. Brown (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 530 F.3d 832, 844 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A trustee is the 
‘legal representative’ and ‘fiduciary’ of the estate.”); Martin v. Martin (In re Martin), 91 
F.3d 389, 394 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he district court was correct in emphasizing the role of the 
trustee as a fiduciary.”). 
 300  In re Novak, 383 B.R. 660, 671 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2008).  Some scholars have also 
attributed a wide range of other duties to bankruptcy trustees, including duties of 
distribution maximization, diligence, accountability, competence, candor, civility, good 
faith, and fair dealing.  Steven Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institutional Obligations of a 
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 147, 154 (2006). 
 301  11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1).   
 302  Id. § 328(a).  
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services that are duplicative, unnecessary, or not “reasonably likely to 
benefit the [debtor’s] estate.”303  The compensation amount is capped based 
on on the value of assets distributed to creditors.304  Aggregate 
compensation of all trustees involved in a case may not exceed twenty-five 
percent of the first $5,000 disbursed, ten percent of the next $45,000 
disbursed, five percent on the next $950,000 disbursed, and three percent 
on any amounts exceeding $1 million.305  The compensation of a trustee 
who distributed $1 million could therefore not exceed $53,250. 
Because the statute commands courts to treat all bankruptcy trustee 
compensation as a “commission,”306 some trustees have claimed that they 
are presumptively entitled to the statutory maximum.307  Courts have 
rejected this argument on the grounds that the Chapter 11 provisions 
specifically require courts to set compensation based on a range of 
variables relating to the nature, extent, and value of a trustee’s services.308  
In light of this, courts generally seek to use an objective market-rate 
standard, subject to the statutory maximums.309  Notably, courts are obliged 
to independently review the reasonableness of fees, even if the interested 
parties have consented to (or failed to object to) the fees.310 
 
 303  Id. § 330(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I).   
 304  Id. § 326(a).   
 305  Id. §§ 326(a), (c).   
 306  Id. § 330(a)(7). 
 307  See, e.g., In re Virgin Offshore USA, Inc., Debtors, No. 11-13028, 2015 WL 
350898, at *3 (Bankr. E. D. La. Jan. 26, 2015). 
 308  Id.; see also In re Marvel Entm’t Grp., Inc., 234 B.R. 21, 38–39 (Bankr. D. Del. 
1999) (rejecting the notion that Congress intended to provide an automatic commission 
based on assets disbursed).  The Marvel court cited six reasons for its conclusion: (1) the 
statutory language, which states that the percentages only constituted a cap and provides 
other factors upon which the court should fix compensation levels; (2) the absence of 
support for this approach in the case law; (3) the absence of “any principled relationship 
between the amounts disbursed by a debtor corporation and what would be reasonable 
compensation for a trustee appointed to represent the estate”; (4) the risk that such an 
entitlement could lead to corruption in the appointment of trustees; (5) the risk that trustees 
will remain in place beyond their usefulness in order to capture financial gains; and (6) the 
risk that “extraordinarily high levels of compensation that bear no reasonable relation to the 
value of the services provided” could cause courts to avoid appointing trustees when it may 
otherwise be appropriate.  Id. at 38–40.  But see Mohns, Inc. v. Lanser, 522 B.R. 594, 599 
n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2015) (stating in the dicta of a Chapter 7 case that “in the case of a 
Chapter 11 trustee, the court should follow § 330(a)(7) and calculate the commission 
pursuant to the formula in § 326. Then, the court should adjust the commission by applying 
the § 330(a)(3) factors.”). 
 309  In re Marvel Entm’t Grp., Inc., 234 B.R. at 41. 
 310  See, e.g., In re Fleming Companies, Inc., 304 B.R. 85, 89 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) 
(stating that “the Bankruptcy Court has an independent duty to review fee requests of all 
professionals retained in a [c]hapter 11 case to assure that the services rendered were 
necessary and appropriate and that the fees requested are reasonable”) (citation omitted); In 
re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 833, 844 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the court 
“must protect the estate, lest overreaching attorneys or other professionals drain it of wealth 
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2. Metric Assessment 
Trustee compensation is structured with a clear nexus to the trustee’s 
legal duty and scale of work. The compensation ceiling formula depends on 
achievement of the trustee’s legal mandate—payment to creditors—rather 
than the size of the company.  This incentivizes trustees to avoid waste and 
furthers the policy purpose of the statute.  In the charity context, an 
equivalent approach may be to link the compensation ceiling to the 
organization’s charitable expenditures.  This metric, which includes most 
administrative and fundraising costs of operating charitable programs,311  is 
already used to determine the maximum allowable amount that charities 
may spend on lobbying activities,312 and could feasibly transfer to the 
compensation context as well. 
Applying the trustee compensation model to the charitable sector 
would nevertheless be inapt in certain respects. First, beneath the formula-
based ceiling, trustee compensation is fixed by a judge according to market 
rate. As discussed in Part V, the market-rate standard is helpful in attracting 
qualified professionals, but can facilitate inflation when insiders perform 
the benchmarking rather than independent judges. Second, while the 
respective legal mandates of bankruptcy trustees and charity executives 
have similarities, expenditures are a stronger proxy for trustee performance 
than charity executive performance. Charity executives are expected to 
build the long-term financial health of their organization and achieve an 
efficient charitable impact. This may involve trimming expenses, growing 
reserves in anticipation of economic downturns, and pursuing cost-effective 
programming, all of which may be discouraged under a system that pegged 
allowable executive compensation to expenditures. A formula-based 
ceiling may, in short, create incentives antithetical to responsible charity 
stewardship.313 
 
 
which by right should inure to the benefit of unsecured creditors”). 
 311  I.R.C. § 4911(e)(1) (defining “exempt purpose expenditures” for the purpose of 
calculating the allowable level of lobbying expenses); Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-4 (elaborating 
upon the meaning of “exempt purpose expenditures”). The exempt expenditures formula 
includes compensation amounts but not lobbying expenditures; this may need to be inverted 
in an exempt expenditures formula for the purpose of determining the compensation ceiling. 
 312  I.R.C. § 4911(c)(2) (permitting charities to spend up to a certain percentage of their 
“exempt purpose expenditures” on lobbying without incurring a penalty tax). 
 313  While charity mismanagement is socially sub-optimal, it would not necessarily 
undermine the policy purpose of the charitable tax exemption. Eligibility for exemption 
depends on whether an organization operates for exempt purposes, not whether it operates 
efficiently or sustainably. Nevertheless, at a certain point, profligacy in furtherance of a 
higher executive salary must surely contravene the requirements of Section 501(c)(3).  
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C. Potential Synthesis and Further Investigation 
The compensation frameworks for federal employees and bankruptcy 
trustees both offer transferable elements that could enhance the metric for 
reasonable compensation in the charitable sector.  The federal employee 
scale provides an analytically sound analogue to the charitable sector, as 
both are subsidized by taxes in order to provide socially beneficial outputs.  
The most salient weakness of the analogue, the relative security of federal 
employment vis-à-vis the private sector, can be measured and incorporated 
into the scale.  The trustee framework contributes the notion of a formula-
based rather than fixed-ceiling.  This acknowledges the variance in 
responsibility and complexity in organizations of different sizes and 
provides an opportunity to link compensation to the furtherance of 
charitable purposes, albeit at the risk of introducing incentives for 
suboptimal management. 
A synthesis of these strengths might be a graduated scale of ceilings 
for tax-advantaged compensation based on charitable expenditures.  
Ceilings could be determined with reference to federal compensation 
levels, plus a risk premium.  For example, an organization with large 
charitable expenditures may have a ceiling based on Level 1 Senior 
Executive Service pay (including the value of federal benefits), while an 
organization with smaller expenditures may have a ceiling based on Level 
2.  Charitable expenditures could be defined to exclude executive 
compensation amounts themselves, so that high compensation could not 
serve as its own justification.  The relevant expenditure level could be 
averaged over several years so that executives are not penalized for saving 
funds or unduly rewarded for high spending in any given year. A graduated 
scale is normatively superior to the current ceiling, as it would link tax-
advantaged compensation to: (1) the policy objectives of Section 501(c)(3) 
status; and (2) public-sector compensation, which is similarly taxpayer-
funded.  It also offers the practical benefit of capturing excessive 
compensation below the $1 million mark. 
While such reform may hold promise for the charitable sector, the 
history of unintended consequences from compensation reform reinforces 
the need for further investigation. Relevant questions include (1) whether 
the TCJA excise tax successfully curtails charity compensation or 
reproduces the effects of Section 162(m) (i.e., a rise in compensation 
towards the $1 million ceiling, a willingness to absorb the tax 
consequences, etc.); (2) whether the removal of the loophole for 
performance-based compensation under Section 162(m) somehow tames 
excessive compensation in public companies; and (3) whether the I.R.S.’s 
analytics-based targeting initiative succeeds in identifying noncompliant 
charities. The outcomes of these policy changes may have implications for 
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the viability and optimal design of the regulatory enforcement action 
mechanism and the excise tax mechanism. It would also be valuable to 
determine the effects of State-imposed limitations on charity compensation, 
thought these are currently few. Finally, there is the open question of 
whether boards can be relied upon to police the organization’s finances 
such that an expenditure-based formula would be unlikely to jeopardize 
long-term financial health. Resolving these questions would be instructive 
in the redesign of executive compensation in the charitable sector. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
While the TCJA excise tax provides a promising step forward, the 
oversight framework for charity executive compensation remains poorly 
tailored to the goals of charitable tax status.  The underlying policy purpose 
of Section 501(c)(3) is to subsidize, through tax exemption and deductible 
contributions, private organizations that provide charitable outputs without 
diverting resources to private hands.  Current law imposes only piecemeal 
accountability on charities that are targeted for scrutiny by the media, are 
individually examined by the I.R.S., or pay over $1 million to their top 
executives.  The TCJA excise tax mechanism strikes an appropriate balance 
between enforcing the policy purpose of Section 501(c)(3) and preserving 
charity discretion.  By improving the metric for appropriate compensation, 
the excise tax could provide accountability to taxpayers and restore 
confidence in the charitable sector.  A graduated scale of compensation 
ceilings tied to public-sector salaries and charitable expenditures could 
provide normative and practical advantages over the existing metric, but 
reform efforts should be informed by further research regarding, among 
other things, the effects of the TCJA and I.R.S. enforcement innovations. 
 
